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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

IMPROVING NETWORK POLICY ENFORCEMENT USING NATURAL LANGUAGE
PROCESSING AND PROGRAMMABLE NETWORKS
Computer networks are becoming more complex and challenging to operate, manage,
and protect. As a result, Network policies that define how network operators should
manage the network are becoming more complex and nuanced. Unfortunately, network
policies are often an undervalued part of network design, leaving network operators to
guess at the intent of policies that are written and fill in the gaps where policies don’t exist.
Organizations typically designate Policy Committees to write down the network policies in
the policy documents using high-level natural languages. The policy documents describe
both the acceptable and unacceptable uses of the network. Network operators then take
the responsibility of enforcing the policies and verifying whether the enforcement achieves
expected requirements.
Network operators often encounter gaps and ambiguous statements when translating
network policies into specific network configurations. An ill-structured network policy
document may prevent network operators from implementing the true intent of the policies,
and thus leads to incorrect enforcement. It is thus important to know the quality of the
written network policies and to remove any ambiguity that may confuse the people who
are responsible for reading and implementing them. Moreover, there is a need not only to
prevent policy violations from occurring but also to check for any policy violations that may
have occurred (i.e., the prevention mechanisms failed in some way), since unwanted packets
or network traffic, were somehow allowed to enter the network. In addition, the emergence
of programmable networks provides flexible network control. Enforcing network routing
policies in an environment that contains both the traditional networks and programmable
networks also becomes a challenge.
This dissertation presents a set of methods designed to improve network policy
enforcement. We begin by describing the design and implementation of a new Network
Policy Analyzer (NPA), which analyzes the written quality of network policies and outputs a
quality report that can be given to Policy Committees to improve their policies. Suggestions
on how to write good network policies are also provided. We also present Network Policy
Conversation Engine (NPCE), a chatbot for network operators to ask questions in natural
languages that check whether there is any policy violation in the network. NPCE takes
advantage of recent advances in Natural Language Processing (NLP) and modern database
solutions to convert natural language questions into the corresponding database queries.

Next, we discuss our work towards understanding how Internet ASes connect with each
other at third-party locations such as IXPs and their business relationships. Such a graph
is needed to write routing policies and to calculate available routes in the future. Lastly,
we present how we successfully manage network policies in a hybrid network composed of
both SDN and legacy devices, making network services available over the entire network.
KEYWORDS: Network Policy, Policy Violation, Policy Quality, Software-Defined Network,
Natural Language Processing
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

Computer networks are becoming more and more complex. The explosive growth in the
number of devices, and the types of devices being attached to the network has dramatically
increased the variety of types of network traffic being generated. Organizations regulate how
they want the network resources to be used by defining Network Policies. Network policies
are the set of rules that organizations use to describe the acceptable and unacceptable
uses of network resources. These policies are usually defined in network policy documents,
sometimes called Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs). Organizations such as universities often
publish these documents online making them available for the users to read. Users of the
networks are expected to follow these rules when they are using the network resources.
However, policy violations may still occur due to misunderstandings or neglect of policies.
Network administrators, who manage the networks, are responsible for continuously
ensuring that organizations’ networks are running in a way that strictly follows the rules
described in the network policy documents. On one hand, they have to ensure the usability
of the networks, making sure the quality of the network service provided to users meets
the desired operational goals. On the other, they have to ensure there are no unwanted
types of traffic in the network as described in the policy documents. Network operators
must use their knowledge to configure network devices (e.g., switches, routers, firewalls,
servers/services), to detect and prevent those unwanted types of network traffic. Taking
advantage of various network monitoring tools, network administrators can detect policy
violations and make adjustments accordingly.
Policies recorded in the policy documents are important. Users of the network
read the network policies to understand how they should use the network. For network
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administrators, they rely on the network policy documents to set up a network environment
that not only provides high-quality network services to the users but also can detect and
deal with policy violations. However, organizations typically appoint a special group of
people, known as Policy Committees to compose the network policies in natural languages.
The challenge is to make these policy documents clear enough for both the users of the
networks and network administrators to understand.
This chapter introduces network policies from the perspective of how they are
composed and enforced. First, we give real-world examples of network policies written
in natural languages that we found on various university websites to illustrate the types of
network policies in use today. Then, we discuss how these network policies are enforced on
network devices and how network operators check whether these policies are implemented
correctly.

After that, we describe the nature of network policies and policy writing

and implementation to illustrate why network policy management is complex. Once the
problems are listed, we present our effort and contributions to address the related problems
that exist in network policy management. At the end of the chapter, we discuss the overall
structure of the dissertation.
1.1

Types of Network Policies

Network policies define the acceptable and unacceptable use of the network. These policies
reflect the organization’s goals and must be designed and implemented with a great deal of
care and accuracy. The implementation of network policies can be considered a process of
taking action on certain types of network traffic under specific circumstances. We categorize
the network policies in this dissertation into the following groups based on the description
of the network traffic or packets.
• Policies regarding network traffic with clear packet header information:
The network policies in this group mainly focus on preventing traffic of a certain
type, either because the network owner does not want to support certain types of
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traffic/activity, or to block malicious traffic that is considered a security risk. For
example, the Policy Committees may write in the policy document that “FTP traffic
is prohibited in the network” to prevent the use of FTP (an insecure file transfer
protocol). The protocols used are directly reflected in the packet header information
and the policies can be enforced to “block” such traffic simply based on the packet
header information.
• Policies regarding network traffic that needs further processing: Some
network policies may require further processing of the network traffic described in the
policies. They require certain types of network traffic that must go through a specific
middlebox. For example, Policy Committees may write, “All incoming network traffic
from the Internet must go through the Firewall.” The middleboxes mentioned here
are designed to examine, filter, convert or somehow analyze/process the traffic. Example types of middleboxes include firewalls, intrusion detection/protection systems
(IDS/IPS), traffic shapers, load balancers, network address translators (NAT), and
application gateways. The action to perform on the traffic type mentioned in the
policy is based on the result of the middlebox analysis results.
• Policies regarding network traffic that requires network state information:
Sometimes, network packet information is not enough to match the network traffic
described in the policies. Additional network state information is required to detect
and match such network traffic. For example, “Block the account if the number of
failed login attempts is greater than ten.” In this example, the number of failed login
attempts surpassing a threshold of ten is the triggering event for blocking an account.
Catching these types of events is often complicated by the need to maintain state
information, as opposed to other types of policies that simply need to look for the 5tuple values (Protocol, source IP, destination IP, source port number, destination port
number) in the packet header information. As a result, more complex mechanisms
are required to detect the existence of such events.
3

• Policies with exceptions: The network policies published in the AUPs are usually
focusing on the general rules of how network resources should be used. However, the
existence of these policies may sometimes restrict the work that has been recognized
and approved by the organizations. For example, universities may have policies that
the normal network traffic on campus should go through the middleboxes for security
checks. University researchers working on big data transfer may request exceptions to
the policies because the Deep Packet Inspection applied at these middleboxes greatly
slow down the transfers. As a result, organizations often have network policies with
exceptions to satisfy the potential needs. These exceptions will be carefully reviewed
by the organization’s authorities. The Vip Lanes system [1] deployed at the University
of Kentucky allows a restrictive set of network traffic from pre-approved machines to
be routed directly to the campus edge router without going through the middleboxes
on campus.
1.2

Example Network Policies
• Policy 1: “Applications which transmit sensitive information over the
network in clear text, such as telnet and ftp, are prohibited and will be
blocked. [2]”. In the policy, the action to take is “block”, and the signature of
the traffic is traffic transmitted in clear text such as telnet and ftp. Enforcing such
a policy is straightforward if the network operators know the low-level details (e.g.,
packet header field values) of the traffic pattern, such as the transport layer protocol
and the destination port number these protocols use. The network operators can also
use passive monitoring to see whether traffic has ever appeared. This policy belongs
to the first policy group as we defined earlier since protocols such as telnet and ftp
match directly to the packet header information.
• Policy 2: “The University Wireless Network should not be misused; in
particular, you should not use the network to: run peer-to-peer (P2P)
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file sharing software, e.g., BitTorrent.

[3]”. This policy is also simple; in

particular, it requires that the BitTorrent traffic should be blocked. Similar to the
previous policy, it can be enforced and monitored using the low-level details associated
with the BitTorrent protocol. It also falls in the first policy group due to the existence
of the BitTorrent protocol.
• Policy 3: “For a computer system to be managed securely, functional unit
technicians must: Disable or secure remote access from system-to-system
(e.g., rlogin) [4]”. This policy is also categorized into the first policy group due to
the description of the protocol rlogin. Network operators use the low-level details of
the Rlogin protocol to enforce and monitor the policy.
The three network policies listed above are straightforward since the policy statements
clearly define the action to take on traffic with specific signatures. They also provide
explanations or give specific examples of the meaning of the policy statements. Taking
the first policy, for example, network traffic that transmits information in cleartext
uses protocols such as telnet and FTP. So the network operators clearly understand
that they need to keep an eye on the traffic associated with the protocols mentioned
above.
• Policy 4: “Network usage judged appropriate by the University is permitted. Some activities deemed inappropriate include, but are not limited
to: Attaching unauthorized network devices, including but not limited to
wireless routers, gateways DHCP or DNS servers; or a computer set up
to act like such a device [5]”. This policy contains a combination of ill-defined
terms/phrases and well-defined examples. For example, when the network operators
want to implement this policy, they would not understand the meaning of the term
“unauthorized network devices.” They need a clearer definition of how to represent
the “unauthorized network devices” so that they can translate it into the low-level
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identifiers that they are familiar with. In this case, there are some well-defined
examples that the network operator would be familiar with like ”wireless routers,
gateways, DHCP or DNS servers,...”. These help with the implementation of the rule,
but do not fully specify all types of ”unauthorized network devices”. This policy can
also be categorized into the first policy group since the policy’s goal is to block the
traffic from unauthorized wireless routers, gateways, DHCP or DNS servers. In short,
the network operator needs words and phrases that have a clear and precise meaning
in order to be able to implement a policy.
• Policy 5: “Most network services through non-standard ports are not
supported.

Services through non-standard ports may be restricted to a

limited number of subnets or hosts. For example, WWW access via the
standard HTTP port will be permitted, but via some other arbitrary port
number may not be permitted [6]”. This policy also aims to block certain types of
network traffic. It gives HTTP traffic running on a non-standard port as one example
of the types of traffic that should be blocked. However, the statement’s phrase “most
network services” is ambiguous. Had it said ”Any network service” running on a nonstandard port, it would have been a more clear and more precise policy statement
with the potential to be implemented correctly by an operator. It should be clearly
defined which services are being defined/described by the policy.
The above two network policies both contain words or phrases that can be understood
differently by different network operators. Even though the examples they provide to
some extent help with the explanation, it is still not enough for network operators to
get the true intent behind these network policies without any misunderstanding. We
still need a mechanism to eliminate the potential ambiguity of the policy statements.
• Policy 6: “Campus printers should not be exposed to the public Internet.
[7]”. Undoubtedly, it can be categorized into the first policy group. However, it is
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still unclear what the phrases “campus printers” and “the public Internet” mean and
what types of low-level identifiers we should use to represent these phrases.
• Policy 7: “Port scanning or security scanning is expressly prohibited
unless prior notification to Information Technology Security is made [8]”.
This network policy fits in the third policy group. The phrases “port scanning” and
“security scanning” are still ambiguous since they are not precisely defined in a way
that all network operators agree with. There have been various IDS tools analyzing
port scanning but their implementations and definition of port or security scanning
are not necessarily the same. For example, one possible definition for such traffic is
“a connection that tries to send traffic to more than M ports within N seconds.” The
traffic patterns are more complex to match than the ones that only use the values in
a packet header’s 5-tuple since it requires the network state information such as the
amount of such traffic reaching a specific number as a triggering event. The policy
also falls in the last policy group since it has exceptions that the scanning will be
allowed once approved by the ITS.
• Policy 8: “The following services or features must be disabled: All source
routing and switching [9]”. Except for the phrase “source routing and switching”,
this network policy statement is easy to understand. It is clearly in the first policy
group. However, the characteristic of the source routing traffic should be described
by a specific packet header, e.g., the IP option field, which is beyond the scope of
the regular 5-tuple fields. Once the low-level details are specified, it will be easy for
network operators to enforce or monitor such policies.
The above three network policies involve networking terms that need to be clarified
further in their low-level details. But unlike network traffic defined simply by the
application layer protocols, the traffic to match here is more complicated. They can
refer to a list of IP addresses, the count of port numbers exceeding a number as the
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triggering event, or an ill-defined source switching signaling protocol. The special
terms or phrases in these policies need to be specified more carefully.
• Policy 9: “Individual or blocks of IPv4/IPv6 addresses not observed to
be in use for a period of time, such as six months, are subject to be
reclaimed and reassigned by NS with notice to the affected person, group,
or place [10]”. There is no network action to take in this policy; rather there is
a communication action that must be taken. This policy is in the last policy group,
and the network state information required here is that the IP address is not used for
more than six months. Given a list of IP addresses covering the IP range of a campus
network and the meaning of the phrase ”not used” (which needs to be defined), one
should be able to find such IP addresses if they exist.
• Policy 10: “All external and wireless connections to University networks
must pass through a network firewall [11]”. We found this network policy
on the website of Loyola University Chicago. This policy can be categorized into
the second group which involves the middlebox firewall. It requires that network
operators redirect all traffic coming from the addresses outside the campus network
to the firewall for further processing. The definition of the word “external” is not
well-defined and needs to be clarified to be correctly implemented.
In addition to the written policies, there may be implied policies, such as the need to
provide full connectivity between all end systems on the network (i.e., all hosts should be
able to reach one another). These ”implicit rules”, although not formally mentioned in
most network policy documents, are often known to network operators who automatically
include them as part of the list of network policies.
1.3

Writing, Enforcing and Monitoring Network Policies

Organizations require network policies to ensure the desired behavior of their networks.
Network policies not only protect the organizations from security attacks but also define
8

which services and traffic the organization wants to enable and support (or prevent). Thus,
network policies are of great importance to the organizations and need careful management
from being written to being enforced. In other words, there are two parts of network
policies that make them difficult to manage: (1) How the network policies are written and
(2) How the written network policies are implemented and how network operators monitor
the network to find any existing policy violation.
In Figure 1.1, the lifecycle of a network policy is shown.

Figure 1.1: Network Policy Generation, Translation and Enforcement Workflow
1.3.1

How Network Policies Are Written?

To ensure that the network is running smoothly and safely, organizations typically designate
various Policy Committees to design and write the network policies in policy documents
available to network operators and possibly to the network users. An Acceptable Use
Policy, which is also known as an AUP, is typically a document that specifies both the
acceptable and unacceptable uses of the properties of an organization [12]. A network AUP
works as a contract between the university and the campus network users at the university
level. It outlines the terms and conditions by specifying what the users cannot do and
the consequences of violations. An AUP is usually drafted by a committee composed
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of stakeholders from different units and job levels. It ensures that ideas from different
perspectives will be considered in the composition of an AUP.
1.3.2

Network Policy Enforcement and Monitoring

A network is composed of devices connected by links and services/protocols running on those
devices. Devices can roughly be categorized as end systems (personal desktops/laptops,
cellphones, work stations, servers, etc.), connection points (switches, routers, wireless access
points, etc.), and middleboxes (Firewall, IDS/IPS, etc.). Each type of device serves a distinct
role and has a distinct set of functionalities. It is the services running on these devices
and the protocols that they use to communicate over the network that tend to be the
object of network policies. In this dissertation, we will mainly focus on the configuration
of the connection points and middleboxes needed to enforce the network policies. Note
that policy enforcement can also occur at the end systems, but often involves applicationlevel configurations such as web server configurations, file server configurations, printer
configurations, etc. But note that end systems can also run firewalls that block or redirect
certain traffic which could be considered to be a middlebox-type capability (but running on
the end system). In that sense, our approach applies to end systems as well, but network
operators might not have the necessary access to configure/place network policies in end
systems.
Assuming network operators take full control over the switches and routers in the
network (noting that they may not have control over the end systems such as clients and
servers), there are several steps they need to go through to enforce network policies. Once
they have access to the network policy documents, they should check whether there are any
ambiguous statements related to the content, action, or conditions for policy enforcement
and tell the policy writers if the policies are not precise enough to be implemented. They
should also notify the policy writers if some policies are not implementable. It is possible
that the available monitoring systems in the network cannot detect certain types of network
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traffic, (e.g., checking certain packet headers requires Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), which
may be unavailable).
Next, the network operators may insert rules into the network to block, reroute
or rate limit network traffic described by the network policies. In a traditional network,
network operators use the tools provided by the vendors to configure the devices. For
example, to set up configurations on devices such as Cisco routers or switches, network
operators have to master the skills of using the Cisco IOS CLI tool, which requires a
detailed understanding of the syntax of the commands to be typed in the terminal for the
configuration for each protocol. Other switch vendors (e.g., Aruba, Juniper, Dell, IBM, etc)
each have their own switch operating system and commands. Often network operators have
to understand how to create Access Control Lists (ACL) using the command and make
changes as necessary. Since these tools are vendor-specific, network operators inevitably
find it difficult when the network is composed of devices from different vendors. The
coordination among these devices is vital to ensure that network policies are correctly
enforced everywhere in the network. If even a single connection point fails to enforce
the policies, the overall network could be vulnerable to attack or misuse. Under some
circumstances, the configurations need to change dynamically, creating additional exposures
to attacks or misuse. In short, it is challenging and difficult for network operators to
implement policies on devices from different vendors since it requires coordination across
different platforms. Note that if a network consists of homogeneous devices, the network
vendor can provide features to help network operators maintain configurations across
devices, but the potential for errors or mistakes still exists.
After the network policies have been implemented/deployed into the network,
network operators need to verify whether the configurations they set up are correct or
not. Traditionally, they can take advantage of either the monitoring functionalities that
come with the middleboxes (e.g., Firewall, IDS/IPS) or those applications that capture
the network traffic on the interfaces of the connection points (e.g., routers, switches).
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For example, IDS solutions such as Snort [13], Suricata [14], and Zeek/Bro [15] provide
mechanisms to monitor traffic for the signature of certain (undesirable) traffic patterns.
Network operators can set alerts based on the traffic type they want to monitor, and when
these types of network traffic are detected, an alert will be promptly sent to the network
operators. The use of such IDS systems is often necessary since some policies require instant
action when a violation is found. The alerts help the network operators react quickly and
adjust or modify the network configuration to do a better job enforcing network policy.
Traffic capturing tools such as NetFlow [16] and Tcpdump [17] can also be used to
find whether certain types of traffic exist in the network. However, this process also requires
adeptness in using such tools and the ability to find the target network traffic or packets
from the redundant packet trace or flow log files. In particular, network operators need to
appropriately pre-configure these tools using the low-level details they translate from the
network policy documents and keep an eye on the traffic they want to monitor. Using these
types of passive monitoring tools has several disadvantages:
• All settings must be correctly set up in advance. It is not practical to dump
all the log files of network traffic since (1) the volume of those files is huge and (2)
Network administrators will need to filter the information they want from the often
redundant log files. Based on the types of network traffic network administrators
want to monitor, they will have to correctly set the filters and keep the log files that
only record that traffic. Consider the example where a network administrator wants to
know the packets arriving on an interface of a device for a period of time, they can run
tools such as Tcpdump to capture and analyze those packets. However, if they only
want to focus on the packets of specific protocols such as ARP, there is completely no
need for them to dump the information of all the packets. Instead, they may want to
pre-configure the Tcpdump command and only record those packets of their interest.
In this case, the settings have to be accurate and precise. If anything is missing,
network operators will not be able to find the existence of certain types of network
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traffic that is described in the network policy documents.
• The use of any single tool does not satisfy all the potential needs. Tools
such as IDS systems, packet capture systems, and flow monitors often have different
and limited functionality. For example, when one wants to check a specific field in
the packet header, most IDS tools and flow capturing tools such as Netflow cannot
accomplish the task. Tools such as Ping and Traceroute provide a different type
of functionality from packet capture or flow analysis and are able to debug the
connectivity failures. But the type of packets they can generate using these tools
is quite limited.
1.4

Interpreting the Intent of a Network Policy

Another challenge is checking whether network policies are correctly interpreted and
implemented. This requires getting to the intent of the network policy statements and
then implementing it across multiple levels of the network stack.
• The challenge of getting the real intent behind the policies: Since network
policies are written in high-level natural languages, it is sometimes difficult for network
administrators to get the true intent behind these policies and what configurations
they need to set up to fulfill the intent. First of all, the imprecise definition of network
policies always makes it difficult for people to understand them. Network policies are
often written to express a high-level goal (e.g., cleartext passwords are not allowed on
the network) without describing the protocols that would violate this goal and saying
these protocols should be blocked by the network. Alternatively, the intent of a policy
might be misunderstood because it uses terms or phrases that cause misunderstanding.
Consider the following network policy, “Most network services through non-standard
ports are not supported.” The confusion the network operators may have is that
“What does most network services mean?” Of course, network operators may take
advantage of their knowledge and write down a list of all the network services they
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have in mind. However, they cannot know the specific intent – i.e., the exact list
of network services this network policy refers to, which could cause problems in the
network when they overcommit or miss specific critical configurations. While these
types of network policies are imprecise, network operators often have some idea of
what to do.
There exist some network policies that are written with high-level goals that network
operators do not know what to do with. Consider the following network policies, “The
deployment of network applications should be secured” and “The university should
provide users with a secured network”. Note that both network policies contain highlevel goals but have no indication of how to achieve the goal (i.e., what to do). Network
operators have to translate the goals into specific configurations and the large gap
makes the configuration error-prone.
• Complicated Network Environment: Network policies exist on different layers
of the Network infrastructure. On one hand, organizations have network policies
that govern the internal network, e.g, intra-domain policies. Within the network
of an organization, different types of network devices may co-exist. For example,
universities may at the same time own both conventional switches and SDN-capable
devices. In such a hybrid network, knowing how to manage both the legacy devices
together with SDN-capable devices becomes a question. The source of the difficulties
comes from the fact that the functionalities provided by both types of devices are
different. For the traditional network switches and routers, network administrators
have to use the command-line interface (CLI) to configure each device.

This is

not convenient especially when the rules or the configurations have to be changed
frequently. For example, “on-demand exceptions” may occur when network users
require rules to configure them in a timely manner but only need them for a short
period of time. Network administrators may not be available all the time and cannot
configure the rules immediately after the users’ request. SDN-capable devices can be
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programmed, making it easier to change the configuration on-demand (e.g., when an
exception is needed). However, if the network consists of both conventional switches
and SDN-capable switches, making programmatic changes across the entire network so
that policies are enforced correctly everywhere is challenging. Such networks require
careful design before actual implementation. Besides the policies that govern the
internal network, organizations also need to consider the traffic to and from the
outside networks, e.g, inter-domain policies. Network operators need to know how
to provide users with high-quality network services to connect to the Internet while
thinking about whether there are any security issues. All of these are aspects that an
organization needs to consider and write them down when composing formal network
policy documents.
• Complexity in network monitoring/verification: Suppose the network operators
have finished setting up the configurations based on the network policy statements;
they must also figure out whether the configurations they set up are correct or not.
In general, there are two approaches to verifying correctness. The first approach is
static verification, which focuses on checking whether they comply with the network
policies. However, this approach is heavily dependent on the specific tools they use.
The second approach is to use a snapshot of the data plane traffic for verification.
One can capture the network traffic and analyze whether certain types of traffic that
violate the network policies have appeared. One can also actively generate test packets
and force them to go through the network devices and see how the packets are dealt
with. We will provide a review of related work in later chapters, but for now, will
simply list some of the challenges in verification monitoring. First, the tools to use
for monitoring (e.g., IDS) or analysis (e.g., network configuration files) are limited
by the rules or mechanisms that come along with the tools. For example, if we use
an IDS tool to monitor network traffic, we are confined by its functionality and may
not be able to detect certain types of intrusions/attacks. If we analyze a Cisco router
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configuration file, we cannot use the same approach for HP Aruba router configuration
files. Second, the data plane is where network traffic is transmitted. The network
traffic generated by the monitoring or active probing/testing may affect the network
performance. Network operators should carefully plan such additional services to
maintain network performance. In particular, they should consider the questions such
as “When and where should the monitoring be performed?”, “What tools should be
used as the monitoring facility?”, “How much network traffic will be generated and
is it a great portion of the normal network traffic?”, “What tools/techniques should
be used to generate the correct test packet?” and “How can we specify the path and
force the packet to follow the path?”. These example questions are the ones that
network operators should ask themselves when developing a way to verify whether
the network policies have been correctly implemented.
1.5

Tools That Help Network Policy Enforcement

As discussed in the above sections, the main obstacles that lie in the enforcement of natural
language network policies can be described as (1) the difficulties in understanding the
network policies completely and accurately and (2) the limitation of tools and techniques
for network policy enforcement and verification in the complex and volatile network
environment to satisfy various needs of the organization.

We introduce two popular

technologies used in this dissertation that can address the aforementioned problems.
• Natural Language Processing (NLP) To deal with network policies that are
written in high-level natural languages, Natural Language Processing (NLP) is a
feasible solution that satisfies the needs of “understanding” the policy text. Named
Entity Extraction is a technique in NLP to extract useful information from the given
text.

To analyze a network policy and get the intent behind it, we can create

named entity extraction models to fetch useful information and filter the redundant
information. The output can be used by other applications to achieve the final goals.
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• Software-Defined Network (SDN) The mechanisms used to control and manage
traditional networks have limitations.

Inflexibility is one of the most noticeable

limitations. The emergence of SDN to some extent solves the problem. The separation
of the data plane and the control plane provides flexible control of the network devices
since users can write customized applications that are in charge of how the traffic
will be handled by the network. This can be used by network operators to insert
fine-grained policy rules into the network that otherwise might not be supported by
conventional network devices. At the same time, SDN also provides a bird’s eye view
of the entire network and thus can provide insights into whether policies are being
violated.
1.6

Dissertation Contributions

In this dissertation, we extend earlier work of translating network policies into network
configurations with exceptions. We address the problems in network policy enforcement
with the following contributions.
• A system to analyze the quality of written network policy: The ambiguous
terms or phrases in the network policies significantly influence whether they will be
enforced correctly. We propose Network Policy Analyzer (NPA), a system that can
generate a quality report for any given network policy. NPA mimics the questions
that network operators may have in mind when reading and implementing a network
policy. It focuses on the 5-Tuple (source IP address, destination IP address, source
port, destination port, protocol) and checks if there is any word in the policy that
is ambiguous or missing for the mapping to the 5-tuple. Based on the NPA results,
Policy Committees can improve the quality of the network policies so that network
operators will have less confusion during the enforcement process. At the same time,
people who use the network will also be clear about the violations and regulate their
behaviors using the networks after reading the well-written policies.
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• A Chatbot to check network policy violation: The gap between the natural
language policies and the low-level implementation details is making the process
tedious and error-prone to check whether a policy has been correctly enforced. We
propose Network Policy Conversation Engine (NPCE), a chatbot for the users to check
for network policy violations in the network. Key to NPCE is a natural language
mapping layer that extracts the valuable information from the user’s questions and
generates the corresponding database queries to find the existence of certain types
of network traffic. NPCE captures the network traffic using NetFlow and Tcpdump
and imports the log files of the captured traffic into Elasticsearch, which is a fast and
scalable search engine that can be used as the database. The system then utilizes the
extracted information to compose Elasticsearch queries and issue them to the database
to get the raw data of all the traffic that satisfies the filter as the query response. It
generates the final response based on the questions of the users and returns to them
exactly what they want to know.
• Visualizing the Internet topology to support future routing policies:
Current Internet routes network traffic based on the destination addresses. Source
routing, even though mostly banned nowadays due to security issues, may make
Internet routing more flexible. As a first step towards supporting future Internet
routing based on source addresses, we investigate the Internet topology using Internet
Exchange Point (IXP) data. Internet peering is a popular way that ASes choose to
connect. The process involves three participants, the two ASes who want to peer and
the representatives from the third-party facilities, namely Internet Exchange Points
where the peering occurs. Network operators of IXPs need to manually configure the
routing tables of the IXPs to let the traffic flow through after the two customers reach
an agreement. As a first step to understanding Internet peering, we implemented an
Internet topology graph by placing the IXPs at the center of the graph. We collected
data from IXP websites and other data sources showing how ASes connect at IXPs
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and their business relationships. Users can issue cypher queries in the graph database
to fetch the peering information and available routes per their interests.
• Managing network policies in a hybrid SDN/legacy network: The mechanisms used to control and manage legacy networks and SDN networks are different.
Managing a hybrid network composed of both legacy devices and SDN-capable devices
thus becomes difficult. VipLanes [1] is a network service where users can get faster
big data file transfer speed by setting up SDN rules that make the file transfer path
bypass the campus middleboxes. We propose an approach where users, even if their
devices are connected to the legacy devices rather than the SDN devices, can still take
advantage of the SDN service such as VipLanes. With the help of SNMP, the network
connection information such as the port numbers and the IP address of the adjacent
devices can be detected. Using Policy Based Routing, the routing table on the legacy
devices will be modified and route users’ traffic to the SDN network, making the SDN
service available to them.
1.7

Dissertation Organization

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 discusses the background and existing work in the field of network policy
management.
• Chapter 3 presents a system that analyzes the quality of written network policies and
generates reports for the ambiguity in network policy documents.
• Chapter 4 introduces a chatbot that can be used by network operators and
policymakers to ask natural language questions to check policy violations.
• Chapter 5 develops an approach to understanding Internet topology connection points
(IXPs) and the implications on network routing policies.
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• Chapter 6 discusses the management of network policies in a network environment
composed of both SDN and legacy devices, making a SDN-oriented service available
over the entire network.
• Chapter 7 summarizes our contributions and discusses the future directions of the
research.
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Chapter 2:

Related Work

In this chapter, we dive into the details of the related work of network policy management.
We focus on the innovative tools and techniques beneficial to network policy management
and the ongoing research in the field for network policy enforcement and network
testing. In particular, we start with two popular network architectures, namely SoftwareDefined Network (SDN) and Intent-Based Networking (IBN). We show how these network
architectures can help with network automation, policy enforcement, and testing. Then, we
introduce the network devices and tools that network operators commonly use for network
management. Next, we focus on the related work that aims to simplify network policy
enforcement, from the proposal of an intent-definition language to other abstractions that
work between the network policy specification and detailed policy implementations. After
that, we discuss the related work in network testing/verification, e.g., to know whether the
network is configured correctly based on the network policies. Finally, we end by talking
about the appearance of various artificial intelligence techniques such as Natural Language
Processing (NLP) and different machine learning models and how these AI techniques help
in network policy management.
2.1

Traditional vs. Modern Network Architectures

The mechanisms used to enforce network policies have been evolving.

In traditional

networks, network policies tend to be implemented on middleboxes while with modern
programmable networks, controller programs can be written to implement network policies
on those programmable switches and routers. We first compare the traditional network
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architecture with the new programmable network architectures. We also show how these
newly-added features help in the process of building a self-driving network.
2.1.1

Traditional Networks

Imagine that you are the person to manage a computer network composed of various
devices such as switches/routers, middleboxes, and Firewalls. Implementing/deploying a
network policy onto the network involves several steps. First, you have to understand what
functionalities these network devices provide by default. Suppose that devices of the same
type come from the same vendor, you may only need to look at one to understand them
all. Then, you may associate what network policies you want to enforce with the existing
functionalities provided by these devices. Understanding how to use these functionalities
to reflect what policies the network should enforce is essential. When everything is clear,
the last step is to understand how to implement the configurations on each device with
different commands. The entire process requires a lot of manual effort and may result in
misconfigurations in the network due to the limitations of a traditional network.
First, vendor-specific configurations require the development of multiple configurations, one for each vendor’s device in order to enforce policies network-wide. This means
that network operators have to understand the usage of the devices from different vendors.
The differences between command-line interfaces (CLIs) from different vendors can be
significant. Network operators must carefully configure each device and ensure there are no
configuration errors.
Second, traditional network device functionality is static. As a general rule, new
functionality cannot be (dynamically) added to traditional network devices. Thus, if new
network functions are required, network operators have to utilize other tools to achieve the
goals, which not only increases the number of devices in the network but also adds a burden
to the management of the entire network due to the unique mechanisms of the tools.
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2.1.2

Software-Defined Networks

As its name indicates, a software-defined network (SDN) is based on the software that
governs how the network should behave. Unlike a traditional network, which uses firmware
that is difficult to update/change, the SDN architecture enables the network operators to
set up rules on various devices in a timely, efficient manner. The SDN architecture is shown
in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Software-Defined Network Architecture
One of the key ideas of Software-defined networking (SDN) is separating the logical,
software-based control of network switches from the hardware/firmware used to implement
packet forwarding. The infrastructure (hardware) layer is at the bottom of the architecture,
composed of various network devices such as switches and routers. The control layer in the
middle is an SDN controller(s), which determines how the packets will be processed based
on the network policies. The SDN controller is often programmed in the form of matchaction rules applied on the switches in the infrastructure layer. SDN-enabled switches use
the rules to forward, drop, or modify packets as they arrive on the switches in the data
plane. The Controller is working as the brain of the entire network, and it provides a birds’
eye view of the network to ensure that network policies are correctly enforced everywhere
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in the network. SDN’s ability to control the entire network from a central point (i.e.,
the controller) simplifies how network operators manage and monitor the network [18].
SDN controllers typically utilize the popular Southbound Interface (SBI) protocol such as
OpenFlow [19] or Open vSwitch Database (OVSDB) [20] to send or receive instructions to or
from the SDN-capable switches. The application layer at the top of the SDN architecture
increases the flexibility of the network. Network operators can program the network by
writing customized applications to instruct the SDN controller regarding the SDN rules to
create on the SDN-capable network devices.
Each OpenFlow switch maintains a set of flow tables. A flow table contains flow
entries–basically the set of rules governing how the targeted network traffic will be routed.
We show an example flow table in Table 2.1. The table contains four flow entries. Starting
from the bottom, the row that has a matching value of “*” represents the match for all the
network traffic. This flow entry has the lowest priority and drops all the matching traffic.
It mimics what a Firewall does, which is to block the incoming traffic by default. The entry
with priority 1 deals with the ARP packets, and the action is “go to table 1”. The “go to
table” instruction explains which table will be the table to follow in the next processing
pipeline. Since this entry has a higher priority than the “drop all” rule, the matching ARP
traffic will thus follow this “go to table” action. Above that, in the table there is an entry
with priority 2, which deals with the DNS traffic. In the matching field, DNS response
packets are being identified by the use of UDP and source port 53 can be used to determine
that the targeted traffic is the DNS response traffic. The action “output to controller”
means the traffic will be sent to the controller for further analysis. Customized applications
can be written to extract the rich information contained in a DNS response packet. The
hard timeout for this entry is 180 seconds which means that the rule will only exist for 180
seconds after being created. At the top of the table is an entry that matches the source
and destination address along with the traffic incoming port. The action to perform on the
matching traffic is to send it to another specific port.

24

Table ID

Priority

Packets

0

3

500

0

2

3

0

1

1

0

0

1000

Match
in port:3
eth type:ipv4
ipv4 src:10.10.1.1
ipv4 dst:10.10.1.2
eth type:ipv4
proto: udp
udp src: 53
in port:3
eth type:arp
*

Actions/Instructions

Timeouts

apply actions:
output:4

0

apply actions:
output: controller

hard timeout:
180 seconds

goto table:1

0

apply actions: drop

0

Table 2.1: An Example OpenFlow Table
Even though Software-Defined Network (SDN) provides flexibility in network
management, network operators still have to figure out which low-level details they need
to place in the match-action rules. In other words, network operators have to manually
translate the intents they have in mind into low-level configurations, a process that is
tedious and error-prone. Historically, network operators have to provide low-level details
associated with the network policies to either enforce a network policy or to monitor it. For
example, when using an Access Control List (ACL), network operators have to use the lowlevel details such as the 5-tuples to fulfill the intent to “allow” or “block” certain types of
network traffic. From the perspective of network policies written in natural languages, the
SDN architecture helps in the automated implementation of the policies. But the processes
of understanding a network policy and verifying whether the configurations that have been
set up reflect the contents in a policy statement still involve human intervention, making
it questionable whether the policies are correctly enforced in the network. To address this,
there has been interest in supporting the architecture of Intent-Based Networks.
2.1.3

Intent-Based Networks

Intent-Based Network (IBN) can be considered an advanced version of SDN since it takes
advantage of the capabilities of the SDN architecture. It also adds additional components
to make the management of network policies fully automated. As shown in the following
figure, IBN is composed of a three-phase life cycle to realize network policies, namely the
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translation phase, the deployment phase, and the verification/analytic phases [21]. The
architecture of IBN is shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Intent-Based Network Architecture
The translation phase in IBN translates the high-level intents into the policies.
In this phase, the intent definition language may be proposed as an intermediate layer
between the high-level intents network operators want to implement and the resulting
network policies with low-level details. Due to the nature of network policies or intents
(written in natural languages), AI techniques such as NLP can be used to interpret the
intents. Similar to an SDN controller, the orchestrator in the deployment phase takes
into account various requirements and deploys the policies on the devices. The last phase,
the verification/analytics phase, is essential in the IBN architecture. With the help of
SDN, network operators can quickly deploy a network policy. However, they still have to
develop mechanisms to check whether the policies are deployed correctly, e.g., whether
the SDN rules are correct and whether they are implemented on the correct devices.
The verification/analytics phase takes advantage of the fact that the SDN controller can
retrieve the most up-to-date network status to verify whether the desired policies have
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been correctly installed on the devices and whether these policies conflict with any existing
policy. These additional functional components ensure that (1) a network policy is correctly
interpreted (translated into the SDN rule with the correct low-level details) and (2) a
network policy is correctly implemented on the network devices (no violation is found under
such configurations). Such additional functionalities are making it closer to the realization
of a self-driving network, where the network itself can understand, implement and verify
network policies automatically, noting that it is still not a complete solution in the sense
that network policies must be manually converted into the intents that drive this approach.
2.1.4

Transition Challenges from SDN to IBN

Even though the current technologies and designs of SDN and IBN show a promising future,
there are still quite a lot of challenges. As has been discussed in [22], there are several
requirements to make the network truly “Human-Defined”.
1. The network should be automatic and intelligent. This means the system should be
capable of fixing the potential conflicts (e.g, conflicts between network policies) automatically. Such a smart system always involves building blocks from understanding
the intent to verifying whether the network is behaving as expected.
2. The network should be able to understand the commands from network operators
even if the commands are in the format of a human-like language. When network
operators express what they want to achieve in the language they speak daily instead
of the network-specific commands, the network should have some kinds of mechanisms
to convert the expression into the configurations the network can understand. NLP
modules can work as a building block in the entire system to deal with the intent of
the network administrators or network policies.
Unlike the matured mobile ”app stores”, there is no unified app store for SDN
platforms. The reason is that SDN controllers from different vendors offer differing sets of
underlying services. Even if a vendor has its own SDN app store, the applications available
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in the store typically only provide support for a small set of the network functions required.
So they are not enough to satisfy every need of the network operators. As a result, network
operators often have to add the desired features to the applications or they just build the
customized applications from scratch.
When commercial software packages are in production, updates are provided
continuously to make the applications better. It is the same for network systems. The
challenges include how to make the control plane and data plane highly synchronized and
how to verify the correctness of the updates to ensure security and availability.
2.2

Tools for Network Policy Management

We introduce tools and services that are helpful in network policy management.

In

particular, we start by introducing tools such as Access Control List (ACL) and iptables.
We then focus on the locations where these rules can be implemented.

Except on

switches/routers, the middleboxes such as Firewall and IDS/IPS systems are the appropriate
locations to enforce such policies. Then, we introduce the network monitoring tools and
programmability that ease policy management.

We show the ongoing research about

network policy enforcement and verifications. We also discuss how AI technologies can
be used in network management.
2.2.1

Taking Actions on Network Traffic

Network operators often want to take different actions based on the type of network traffic.
So it is natural that we divide the intents of the network operators into two parts: the action
and the match. Similar to the structure of an OpenFlow rule which is in the match-action
format, an Access Control List (ACL) [23] can also determine how network traffic should
be handled. The action part can be either “permit” or “deny” while the matching part has
a variety of available fields based on the type of the ACL. In the early implementations of
ACLs, the match was quite limited since the standard ACL only supported the match on
the source IP address. Later on, with the increasing need for the richness of network traffic,
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extended ACLs came into play and supported matching on the destination IP address,
source/destination port numbers, and protocol [24]. These fields make up the well-known
5-tuple to identify the specific types of network traffic. The 5-tuple has been used in various
network management tools.
In addition to ACLs, network operators may also want to specify the route certain
types of network traffic should take. Network operators can use the command “IP route”
to specify the interface or the next-hop address for a specific type of network traffic to go
through [25]. This capability allows the network operator to control the path that packets
take (i.e., to determine the routing policies).
2.2.2

Middleboxes in the Network

Except for the switches and routers, middleboxes are where essential network functions
are often placed. Common middleboxes include Firewalls, Intrusion Detection/Protection
Systems (IDS/IPS), NAT boxes, Load balancers, and Deep Packet Inspection facilities.
Firewalls are usually placed at the edge of the network to prevent unauthorized
access from the outside network or to constrain the set of allowable (outgoing) destinations
(e.g., blocking access to social media sites from the corporate network). The basic idea for
preventing network traffic is similar to that of an Access Control List (ACL). However, a
Firewall may offer more extensive functionalities based on its type. One can consider that
an ACL matches on a packet level, which is stateless. Matching on the flow level requires
state information, but can provide a higher level view of the network traffic. Firewalls often
support state and can be used to record or block flow-level activity. Firewalls can be either
software Firewalls or hardware Firewalls. Examples of popular software Firewalls include
pfSense [26], ipfirewall [27], PF [28], and iptables [29]. Examples of popular hardware
Firewalls include Palo Alto Networks [30], Cisco Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) [31],
Sonicwall [32], and the Barracuda Firewall [33]. Advanced firewalls can often support up
to layer seven of the network OSI model. In contrast, a stateless ACL, even an extended
one, will typically only support up to layer four – i.e., the transport layer. Such Firewalls
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are popular since they raise the level of abstraction and can provide support for various
applications which traditional solutions cannot deal with.
IDS/IPS are the other types of middleboxes where security mechanisms are placed.
In particular, IDS tools can capture certain types of network traffic specified in advance by
network operators and send alerts to them promptly. The most well-known IDS, such as
Snort [13], Suricata [14] and Zeek/Bro [15] all have different IDS mechanisms/capabilities,
and members in the community have developed various extension modules to support
multiple traffic types in the application layer, ranging from the regular network traffic
to the traffic generated by security attacks. Using these tools, network operators better
understand what is happening in the network.
2.2.3

Network Monitoring Tools

Packet analyzers such as Tcpdump [17] and Ethereal [34] are often used to analyze the
header of each network packet. However, it is not efficient to capture every packet on every
interface. Another way to analyze traffic is to look at network traffic at the flow level
instead of the packet level. The records of packets are aggregated if their headers have the
same values. For example, packets that have the same source IP address and destination
IP address can be used to calculate the total number of packets in a flow that traverses
between these two addresses. Flow-level analysis tools such as NetFlow [16], sFlow [35],
and IPFIX [36] can be used to understand what is happening in the network using a higherlevel view. Both types of monitoring tools are valuable since the network traffic specified
in network policy documents can target both the flow-level and the packet-level.
2.3
2.3.1

Related Work in Network Policy Enforcement
Intent Definition Language

The gap between the network policies written in high-level natural languages and the
corresponding low-level configurations makes the translation process tedious and errorprone. To reduce this gap, researchers are proposing different approaches, such as intent-
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definition languages or other abstractions, to get the intents of the network policies or
network administrators accurately.
Most notably, Nile, an intent definition language proposed in [37], can accurately
capture the intent of the network operators. Network operators still express what they
want to do with the network in natural languages, but in a constrained way. The system
utilizes natural language understanding platforms such as Google Dialogflow [38] to extract
the valuable information within the intent. The authors took advantage of a sequenceto-sequence learning model [39], which was composed of two recurrent neural networks
and a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), to map the user’s statements into Nile. As an
important step in the entire workflow, the result was sent back to the network operators
for confirmation and thus increase the translation accuracy. Even though Nile provides
an excellent template to understand the intents of network operators, we argue that the
grammar of Nile still has room for improvement. The action field in the language was
only limited to “allow” and “block” so it would be helpful only when dealing with network
security policies that focus on “denying” certain types of network traffic. The match fields
were simply the 5-tuple. So it could not deal with network policies that describe the traffic
using information beyond the 5-tuple.
The work in [40] modified Nile by adding constructs to the language structure to
make it suitable in the P4 environment. Their point was that an association between the
intents and the corresponding action on the P4 program’s template should be established.
So they added the action library and the parameters in the intent that will trigger action
on the P4 code. This idea is helpful in the network policy definition since some network
policies are context-based. These types of context-based policies are the ones that will be
triggered under certain circumstances, not the ones that only have one state. For example,
“if the number of bad connection attempts is greater than five, send the suspicious traffic
to the IPS system.” Nile does not cover the intent for this type of network policy since
both the action and the match miss the real action “send-to” and the actual match “bad
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connection attempts greater than five.”
There is also other work proposing intent definition languages. POLANCO proposed
in [41] provides an intermediate language that the network operators can use to map the
network policies – written in high-level natural languages in network policy documents such
as the Acceptable Use Policy. Compared with Nile, POLANCO provides more choices on
the selection of actions and matches on the traffic patterns. The language was based on the
Business Rule Management System, or more specifically, the Drools rule in the format of
“When...then...”. This syntax ensures that the language can map a variety of intents of the
policy statements. One of the potential drawbacks of the approach was that it still required
the human intervention of network operators to translate the network policy statements
into POLANCO, which can sometimes be error-prone.
Language for ACL Intents (LAI) was another intent definition language proposed
in [42] to solve problems related to ACL updates. The language focused on three different
aspects, including the region (e.g., the network domain and devices to look at), the
requirement (e.g., update ACL configuration or packet reachability), and commands (e.g.,
whether network operators want to check, fix or create new ACLs). It was related to network
policy enforcement, but since ACLs are most commonly used for network security policies,
the proposed language could not cover every type of network policy defined in the policy
documents. Yet, for both POLANCO and LAI, network operators have to learn the syntax
of the intent definition language, the translation process, which is considered tedious and
error-prone.
Even though some high-level programming languages such as Pyretic [43] have been
proposed, they are still unable to satisfy today’s Intent-Based Network. In [44], the authors
proposed an Open Software-Defined Framework (OSDF), which involves an intent-based
interface for network operators to express the policies. The framework deals with different
types of services based on their locations and functions. The locations mean whether it is
inter-domain or intra-domain and the actions include route, alert, and QoS Provisioning.
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This service reads the policies from the database and filters them based on the types. Then
the policies are parsed and translated into the potential forwarding rules for the incoming
traffic and finally, the rules are automatically installed on the set of devices using the
information fetched from other modules such as the topology service module. One of the
highlights of this paper is that the OSDF framework includes the policy conflict module,
which deals with the detection of conflicts and recommended fixes. One of the aspects
that may improve in the paper is that they provide the syntax of the policy but do not
give an example to show how elegant the language is. Network operators have to learn
the syntax of the proposed policy language so that it has to be easy to understand. Also,
the scalability has to be investigated further, especially when considering the fact that the
network is dynamic and policies have to be enforced possibly at any time on any device in
the networks of any size.
2.3.2

SDN-Based Solutions

The work proposed in Policy Graph Abstractions (PGA) [45] allowed network operators to
express network policies in the abstraction of graphs. The work focused on the scenarios
where different network operators can create and modify network policies using graphs
simultaneously. PGA has a mechanism to check and fix the potential conflicts among
graphs. The result of such a process provided a single graph containing all the composed
network policies without any conflict. Later, Janus, a framework proposed in [46] extended
PGA by adding the support for Quality of Service (QoS) policies, dynamic policies, and
temporal policies, which had a time constraint. These works provided new mechanisms to
express network policies, but they still required network operators to learn how to use such
tools.
Existing SDN frameworks also have additional modules acting as the intent-based
Northbound interfaces (NBI) that support the definition of network policies, even though
these modules serve different purposes. The ONOS intent framework [47] provides users
with the opportunities to turn their intents into specific SDN rules. An intent is modeled
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as an object that contains network resources, constraints, criteria, and instructions. Then
the framework compiles the intent object into the specific FlowRule object, and the SDN
rules are installed on the corresponding network devices. The framework allows the users to
express their ideas by creating an intent application on the command-line interface (CLI)
or through the REST API.
In [48], the authors proposed extensions to the existing framework which optimize
the path selection based on the real statistics of the network state with multiple intents
considered jointly. One advantage of this extended framework is that there is no need
for modifying the code of the original framework and the module works as an external
application that optimizes the routing. They call it intent monitor and reroute service
(IMR). This application interacts with the intent manager in the intent framework as well as
the flow manager to get the current statistics of the flows generated due to the acceptance of
intents. IMR exposes rest APIs to retrieve data such as the counter of the flow (size, number
of packets that go through the flow) and the lifetime of the flow. The system computes
a route that is good for most cases. They used Clustered Robust Routing (CRR), which
took advantage of the historical data collected over a time period to feed an optimization
model. They compared the maximum link utilization of the original SDN-IP application
in ONOS with the extended clustered robust routing version. The difference between these
two applications is that the original SDN-IP always picks up the shortest paths, while the
extended version will change the routing configuration over time, based on the data collected
and the output of the CRR. The results showed that the extended version of the application
decreased maximum link utilization compared with the original SDN-IP application, which
was a satisfactory result. This work was added to the ONOS codebase.
In [49], the authors adopted the existing ONOS intent-based framework and proposed
a new NBI architecture that allows different users/applications to express their requirements
and policies. For a complex composite intent, the divide-and-conquer technique should be
used. The composite intent was decomposed into subproblems and after the solution to each
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subproblem was found, these solutions were built together to form a complete solution.
In the prototype implementation, they built their own Dynamic Resource Management
(DRM). DRM was first implemented on the Floodlight controller. In the prototype, they
applied a three-layer architecture to the application and used it on the ONOS controller.
The simulation network, which was composed of 40 switches and 122 links, was implemented
in Mininet. Their test results showed that they were not only able to apply the proposed
architecture to the DRM application but also the application was successfully running on
the ONOS system. They checked different intents through the ONOS UI to see whether the
calculated paths along with the average usage ratio were returned so they knew whether
the intents had been implemented and monitored.
The OpenDayLight controller (ODL) also has a Network Intent Composition (NIC)
interface [50] that expresses the user’s intents in the format of the desired network states.
The Interface supports actions such as “allow”, “block”, and “redirect” or even the QoS
intents. An intent is expressed as a set of commands composed of subjects, actions, and
constraints. Users can easily add, remove and modify any intent as they want.
The ODL Nemo project [51] proposed the Nemo intent language to express the
intents. The action list is rich and involves different verbs to convey different meanings.
The network is represented as links and nodes using the keywords Node and Link, and the
policy is defined using keywords “Policy” and “Action”. However, it is still unclear what all
the available statements are that can follow the keyword “Condition” in a policy to express
the match of traffic patterns or any other constraints.
iNDIRA [52] is a tool that interacts with the SDN northbound interface to make
intent-based networking possible. In particular, the goal of the tool was to let the users
express their intents for big data transfer from one endpoint to another in an easy way.
As a result, the language used for the intents was mostly about the connectivity (connect
or disconnect as action) and the bandwidth constraints. They considered these actions as
“services” and other information as “conditions.” They also showed that the iNDIRA tool
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could answer users’ queries as the tool could remove the redundant information and keep
only the valuable information. Since they didn’t give the syntax of the language and based
on the example, which only focused on the situation for data transfer, it was hard to say
that the intermediary covered the needs for the entire set of network policies since it only
dealt with QoS policies and reachability policies.
Domain science applications often suffer poor performance because they do not
have the capability to do self-correction in real-time to do the trouble-shooting based
on the current state of the network. In this scenario, the authors of [53] implemented a
smart ecosystem: Software Defined Network for End-to-end Networked Science at Exascale
(SENSE). A new architecture has been implemented to make the system intent-based,
interactive throughout the service, real-time, and end-to-end.

In a “smart” network

ecosystem, the network service plane should have at least the following two key features:
intent and interaction. Interaction, which is necessary for the subsequent phases, means
that the applications/users should be able to keep in contact with the network to know the
current status of the network. Even smarter, they should know the available services and
resources in case there is any interruption in the current service so that it can be used as a
backup plan. In the implementation, the SENSE project provides services such as knowing
the bandwidth in a certain block, guaranteed bandwidth in duration, and the product of
time and bandwidth. Users of the system are able to immediately provision the network,
and they can also negotiate with the system to know what possible resources are available.
The system also provides quality of service for layer 2 and layer 3 flows.
Summary of the intent-based solutions: Intents refer to what the users want
to do and how they want to deal with certain types of network traffic. These intent-based
solutions either provide an intermediate intent definition language or use NLP to process
the intents. However, none of the solutions covered the entire set of network policies since
the intent was scenario-based. Also, it is still unclear whether the translations from the
network policies to these intents are correct, and the process still requires the intervention
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of network operators.
2.4

Related Work in Network Policy Testing/Verification

A critical step after implementing network policies is to check whether the configurations
that have been set up correctly reflect the intents of network policies. In this section, we go
over the related work in network testing and verification. In particular, we categorize
the work into two groups: (1) Control plane verification/testing and (2) Dataplane
verification/testing.
2.4.1

Control Plane Verification/Testing

First of all, we need to understand what the control plane is. The control plane and the
data plane are not separated in traditional networks. So when we talk about the control
plane, we are referring to the protocols being exchanged such as BGP and OSPF. In an SDN
network, the control plane refers to the applications sitting on top of the SDN controller.
The control plane verification tries to find the errors in the configuration files and the errors
in the code of the SDN applications.
Analyzing the network configuration files is an approach to detecting network
configuration errors. Earlier work such as the tool RCC proposed in [54] to find the
corresponding configuration errors in the BGP configurations came up with high-level
correctness specifications for the BGP configurations, or in particular, the path visibility
and route validity faults. The tool tested the conditions using static analysis and allowed
network operators to test the potential faults before deploying the configurations.
Arc, the high-level abstraction proposed for the control plane in [55] can analyze the
control plane failures under any circumstances. They generated the abstraction from the
configuration files, and thus, the control plane was abstracted as weighted graphs. They
tested the scenarios using a variety of invariants such as “always blocked/isolated/reachable/traverse waypoint.” They showed that the verification took less than 1 second in most
cases, which was much faster than other solutions.
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ERA, which was a tool proposed in [56], aimed to verify the reachability problem.
A step process was deployed. First, they proposed a model that considered the router a
function of the routing announcement it received and the announcement it sent to the
neighbors.

They expressed the routing announcement using binary decision diagrams

(BDD)[57] and grouped these announcements using equivalent classes. Then they analyzed
the reachability problem utilizing the index of these equivalent classes. The evaluation
showed that ERA could perform analysis in near real-time and scale well.
Minesweeper proposed in [58] used constraint-based graphs and combinatorial search
to present a model that could encode the stable states of a network as a satisfying assignment
to a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) formula. They showed that they could check
various network configurations using this model.
Batfish proposed in [59] involved both the control plane and data plane verification
techniques. In particular, in the control plane, it was able to simulate the behavior of all
distributed protocols using a control plane model and get the data plane model. Then
it utilized the data plane verifier described in [60] to analyze the data plane model and
simulate the counterexample packet for network operators to find the error and repair it.
In SDN networks, systems such as Kuai [61] and Vericon [62] were proposed. Their
goal was to verify the SDN programs by either checking the model or proving the theorem.
For example, in [61] the first-order logic was used to check the network invariants.
Control plane testing aims to generate test cases from the programs using models
such as finite state machines. NICE proposed in [63] was a tool that utilized model checking
and symbolic execution to test the OpenFlow programs automatically. The results showed
that it could find bugs that resided in the SDN programs.
2.4.2

Dataplane Verification/Testing

Dataplane is the layer where network traffic is transmitted. The verification and testing in
the data plane aim to find whether the snapshot of the network state satisfies the network
policies.
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Anteater [64], NOD [60], VNM [65] and SymNet [66] are several examples of data
plane verification. More specifically, Anteater [64] dealt with network invariants such as
“loop-free forwarding”, “connectivity,” and “consistency.” It collected data from the network
devices in the data plane and modeled the corresponding behaviors into a satisfiability (SAT)
problem. The system checked these behavior instances using an SAT solver and reported
cases that violated certain network policies. It could find potential errors that existed in
ACLs and Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) tags.
NOD [60] was developed based on the concept of Datalog [67]. The paper started
with the “network beliefs” and checked whether they were violated. It provided a policy
template where different network beliefs were categorized into different sets. Then it used
the features included in Datalog language such as the definition of set, negation, and boolean
predicate to deal with the related problems. It extended the Datalog language and made it
able to scale in larger header spaces.
Verification for Middlebox Network (VMN) [65], as its name indicated, focused on
the verification of networks with middleboxes. The middleboxes were modeled using a
simple forwarding abstraction they proposed along with the packet classes. They proposed
the forwarding model using the behavior of the middleboxes. Finally, they took advantage
of logical formulas to model the network invariants and utilized Z3 [68], an SMT solver, to
check whether these network invariants were held. Similarly, SymNet [66] also had a model
for network middleboxes. A new language, SEQL, was proposed to describe the behavior in
the network data plane. Using symbolic execution, SymNet was able to verify the stateful
network data plane.
Unlike data plane verification, data plane testing can find the problems such as
whether the intents of the network policies are violated or whether there are any hardware
failures or congestion issues, where some of these problems cannot be answered by the data
plane verification. In general, the approach for data plane testing is to generate probe test
packets and compare the monitoring result with the original intents.
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The most notable works under this category include ATPG [69], Monocle [70],
Rulescope [71], and BUZZ [72]. Automatic Test Packet Generation, or ATPG [69] in
short, was a systematic approach that the network operators can use to test and debug
the network. What ATPG did was it could generate a model after it read the network
configuration files from the routers. The model included definitions for packets with ports
and headers, switches as transfer functions, rules represented as how ports and headers
would be modified, rule history as the history of packet port and headers, and topology as
the pairs of connected ports. ATPG also had an algorithm that tried to generate as few
packets as possible. Their evaluation results showed that ATPG could generate several test
packets to test the real-world network on Internet2 and the Stanford backbone.
Monocle [70], a monitoring and testing module lying in the middle of the SDN
controller, sent probes to test whether the forwarding table satisfied the view of the SDN
controller. More specifically, the problem was modeled as a SAT problem and different
types of rules such as unicast rule, drop rule, or multicast rule were treated separately. The
timescale Monocle used was also defined in milliseconds.
Based on Monocle, RuleScope [71] focused on checking whether the rule priority in
the flow table was correct or not. The forwarding behavior was also inspected by sending
probes. BUZZ proposed in [72] focused on the context-based policies where these policies
had special triggering events. It first provided an abstraction for the data unit, which
involved additional fields other than the typical 5-tuple values covering all the potential
matches. Then it used symbolic execution to generate abstract test traffic and used a
translation mechanism to turn the abstract traffic into concrete test traffic.
2.5

Related Work in Natural Language Processing

The primary goal of Natural Language Processing is to understand the semi-structured
language that people use based on the context. The use of NLP has been extended to a
variety of areas, such as Named Entity Extraction, text classification, sentiment analysis,
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and so on. In this section, we focus on the work that utilize NLP in the networking area,
query translation, and policy document analysis.
Lumi [73] is a system that deals with network policy enforcement. The authors
developed a natural language interface where network operators can express their intent
to implement network policies.

The natural interface collected the user’s intent and

extracted useful information from the intent using a Bi-LSTM architecture. The fragmented
information was then assembled and mapped into the intermediate intent definition language
Nile [37]. One of the highlights of their work was that they added the feedback of the
network operators in the loop. Even though the system achieved relatively high translation
accuracy, it was not ensured that the assembled intent was exactly the same as what the
network operators wanted to do. The addition of feedback made the accuracy approach
one hundred percent. The system also provided a chatbot interface where the missing or
wrong extraction could be pointed out by the network operators. Such chatbots made it
convenient for network operators to verify their intent was correctly captured. Though the
system contributed to the ongoing effort in Intent-Based Network, it could not be directly
used to deal with network policies that are written in only natural language. The intent,
compared with natural language network policy, is shorter in length and simpler in format.
It still requires that network operators fully understand the network policy documents and
refine the intent of the network policies. This process itself is tedious and error-prone.
Net2text [74] is a system where network operators can ask questions to understand
the network forwarding behavior. In the query, the network operators can include multiple
features of the traffic they want to know, for example, the ingress/egress port, the
destination for specific traffic, and so on. The query types supported were also rich, which
included “yes or no” questions, or the summarization of the count of traffic and the paths
it traversed. The network traffic statistics data and path data were stored in the database
and questions from the network operators were translated into standard SQL queries. The
response was summarized based on the result of the SQL query response and returned to
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the users. The system focused more on how to summarize the result from the network state
information or traffic statistics in the database. However, there is no evaluation on the NLP
part what is the accuracy they achieved for the information extraction. The examples they
provided, such as “How is Google traffic being handled?” or “Does all traffic to New York
go through Atlanta?” were quite simple queries. The entities in these queries for example,
“Google” and “New York”, are well-known entities that could be easily extracted by the
NLP libraries that come with pre-trained models. “Google” can be mapped to “org” and
“New York” will be mapped to “location”. Also, natural language network policies are
considered more complex than these queries, since they not only involve the description of
the network traffic but also involve the actions to take on the traffic which implements the
policy.
In [75], the authors proposed a network task abstraction layer. In particular, they
abstracted common tasks that were fulfilled by the popular SDN controllers such as the
Floodlight controller [76] and the Ryu controller [77]. These tasks are usually done through
the REST API of the controllers using HTTP verbs such as POST, GET and DELETE.
Each task had a struct that represented the structure of the task. Based on the input of
the users, which is either a query or a command, the struct of the task will be generated
which contained information about the endpoints, keywords, extra info, and type. For
example, a query input “Is h1 connected?” would be abstracted as endpoint (h1), the
keyword (connected), and REST API type (GET). A command input “allow h4 to talk to
h5” would be abstracted as endpoints (h4,h5), the keyword (reach), and REST API type
(POST/DELETE). However, the paper did not present the evaluation results about how
well the information was extracted. In the examples they provided, both the queries and the
commands were expressed using quite simple natural language. The information extraction
approach they used in the paper would not be flexible enough to deal with the natural
language network policies due to the fact that natural language network policies have more
diverse patterns and complex structures.
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Question answering (QA) systems have the ability to generate immediate responses
to the questions of users. These systems utilize Natural Language Processing techniques and
allow users to express their questions using the natural languages they use daily. Answers are
generated based on what the users ask and where those “facts” are stored. For example,
users can ask specific questions about a text paragraph written in English and the QA
system finds the answer within that paragraph. Another example of the QA systems is the
relational database, which uses the relations among the data points and stores the data in
different tables. Structured Query Language (SQL) is a structured programming language
used to write or retrieve information to or from those relational databases. The use of NLP
techniques to translate users’ queries into SQL has thus become a popular research topic.
In [78], the authors proposed Seq2SQL, a deep neural network to translate natural
language questions into SQL queries. Consider a simple SQL query “SELECT a FROM
TABLE name WHERE a equals number”. Their approach analyzed the structure of SQL
queries and divide the query into three sections, namely the column pointer (a in the
example above), the aggregation pointer (such as COUNT if the user asks “how many”),
and the where clause pointer/decoder (a equals number). Given a single table, they assumed
that answers to the users’ questions could be found in the table and they needed to locate
the column and the conditions described in the “WHERE” clause. Similarly, TypeSQL [79]
took advantage of the slot filling techniques to find what information should be inserted into
different slots in a SQL query. They used the WikiSQL dataset and showed that TypeSQL
could achieve higher translation accuracy as compared to previous works.
Some other works utilize NLP to understand privacy policies. The Usable Privacy
Project [80] aims to use NLP techniques and different privacy models to help people
understand websites’ data practices. Most notably, the authors proposed a framework
in [81] to help mobile application developers to check the consistency between the code and
the published privacy policies. It is important since sometimes the actual data collected
by the applications can be different from what is declared in the privacy policies. They
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created mappings between commonly used privacy phrases and the Android application
API methods and checked the existence of violations if the collected data was not described
in the policies. The results showed that they were able to detect policy violations for
different Android applications.
The work described in [82] focused on analyzing the ambiguities in privacy policies.
They used NLP techniques along with the ground theories to define and detect vagueness.
They proposed a scoring system that dealt with policies that had conditional terms,
generalization terms, modality terms, and numeric quantifiers. They measured the privacy
policies of large companies using the proposed scoring mechanism. At the end of the paper,
they also provided suggestions on how to write good privacy policies from the linguistic
perspective. However, they only focused on the policies themselves other than how the
policies were implemented or used. The vagueness that appeared could still lead to other
fields such as how privacy information (data) was collected by those companies. So the
scoring mechanism can be improved with more factors considered.
2.6

Related Work in Adapting SDN in Traditional Networks

Much work has been proposed to introduce the advantages of easy network management
provided by SDN to traditional networks. Some of the work focuses on the architecture and
design problem, while others focus on the virtualization problem such as building controllers
for hybrid networks.
Panopticon [83] is a network architecture proposed by Levin et al.

In this

architecture, legacy switches, and SDN-capable switches were interconnected to form a
logical SDN network. The insight behind this work was to realize the benefits of SDN
by ensuring there was at least one SDN-capable switch on each source-destination path,
without fully deploying SDN. So as to make this happen, they proposed a key mechanism
called waypoint enforcement. With the help of VLAN, every packet that traverses the path
was forced to go to an SDN-capable switch. When the packet arrived on the SDN-capable
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switch, the SDN controller handles it in the same way as is in a pure SDN environment.
They also introduced the concept of SDN-controlled ports (SDNc), which were the access
ports connected to the logical SDN network. Panopticon ensures that each packet going in
or out of the SDNc selected by the network operator always goes through a safe path, with
at least one SDN-capable switch on it. Their results suggested that when as few as 10% of
the distribution switches are SDN-capable, most portion of the enterprise network can be
operated as a single SDN network.
HybNET [84] is a network framework that automates the management in a hybrid
network environment.

In the framework, there exists a configuration mechanism that

translates the legacy network configuration into OpenFlow configuration.

From the

perspective of the controller, there is no distinction between SDN switches and legacy
switches.

By means of virtualization, SDN switches in the framework were mainly

responsible for the network management job, along with the controller, while legacy switches
were only used as the devices to forward traffic. The virtualization was realized using
VLANs.
Telekinesis [85] is a network controller that provides fine-grained control over legacy
paths. Since in an SDN network the controller can instruct the switches where to send the
packet, they took advantage of this fact and introduced LegacyFlowMod, a flow control
primitive, to send a packet with a MAC address to a special interface on the legacy switch.
Since the legacy layer-2 switches run MAC address learning, the forwarding tables will be
updated on the legacy switch. However, this mechanism suffered from drawbacks such as
the coarse-grained path control due to the fact that routing was only destination-based in a
legacy network. The frequent update of the forwarding tables also caused the transmitting
path unstable. To overcome these problems, they proposed Magneto [86] in their later
work, which introduced the concept of the Magneto MAC address to reduce the frequency
of changes in the forwarding tables, make the transmitting path stable.
ClosedFlow [87] is a network controller proposed by Hand et al. In their work, they
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took advantage of the fact that each node in a network running Open-Shortest-Path-First
(OSPF) has complete visibility over the entire network. They enabled remote logging from
the legacy devices to the controller, which allowed the topology to update. Remote access
tools such as SSH/Telnet were also used to log in to the devices and configure fine-grained
rules using Policy-Based Routing (PBR).
2.7

Summary

In this chapter, we described the related work in the field of network policy management.
Different network architectures and technologies can be applied to network policy enforcement and verification. SDN and IBN are the first steps toward the automation of network
policy enforcement. Applications can be written to enforce or verify the correctness of
the implementation. To understand the meaning of natural language network policies,
NLP techniques are undoubtedly a promising approach. We also showed the limitation of
current/past research that addresses network policy management. In the following chapters,
we present how we used NLP and SDN to improve network policy enforcement.
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Chapter 3:

3.1

NPA: A System to Check Ambiguity in Network Policies

Introduction

Network policies are usually composed and recorded in the network policy documents
such as Acceptable Use Policy documents written in human-readable natural language.
These documents are often available online to the users of the network, for them to
understand what they can do or cannot do when using the network resources. Sometimes,
due to a misunderstanding of policies (or even policies not read by the users), unwanted
types of traffic may occur in the network.

As a result, besides ensuring the basic

network connectivity, network administrators take responsibility for enforcing the policies
described in these policy documents to deal with the network traffic.

Historically,

network administrators manually translate the high-level policy statements in the policy
documents into the corresponding low-level network configurations that implement the
policies. However, there is still a gap between the high-level network policy statements
and the low-level detailed network configurations that enforce the policies. In other words,
this manual translation process can be tedious and error-prone since there is a potential
not only to misinterpret the intent behind the policy statements, but also a potential for
human errors when configuring the devices in a complex network environment which can
lead to incorrect enforcement of the policies.
While recent advances in Artificial Intelligence have made it possible to simplify
the translation process, it is still inevitable that network administrators be involved in the
loop to translate the network policies into specific formats that can be used as the input
for the system. Even in Intent-based networking systems that are capable of generating
configurations based on intents, network administrators still have to manually translate
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the statements in the policy documents to the desired intents. Errors can occur during
this translation phase due to a variety of reasons, one of which is the ambiguities of the
network policy statements. The ambiguities in a policy statement may arise if ambiguous
terms are used, or the crucial information for the implementation is missing. Undoubtedly,
ambiguities will confuse network administrators when they enforce the policies.
Policymakers and network administrators are both the stakeholders of the network.
Consequently, they need to cooperate and reach a final agreement on exactly what should
be enforced and the corresponding consequences. Policymakers, who compose the policies,
do not usually have the same level of network expertise as network administrators.
Consequently, policymakers often lack the knowledge needed to understand the difficulties
in enforcing each network policy, or the potential conflicts among implementing various
policies.

If the terms or phrases they use in the policy statements are ambiguous to

the network administrators, it potentially increases the chances that these policies will be
implemented incorrectly, either in part or entirely. Network administrators want network
policies in a clear and precise format that can be directly translated into low-level network
configurations. If a policy statement is ambiguous, network administrators may also wish
to give feedback to the policymakers about the ambiguities and the missing elements in
it. Besides confirming the intent of the policy, they may also want to report the potential
problems when enforcing the policies, such as the conflicts among the policy statements.
Aiming at the ambiguities in network policy documents, we propose Network Policy
Analyzer (NPA), a system with which policymakers and network administrators can
coordinate to improve the quality of a written network policy document. The proposed
system takes as input a network policy document and starts from the perspectives of network
administrators, mimicking what they are thinking about when enforcing the given network
policies, and returns any ambiguous or missing elements in a policy statement that should be
improved for the correct enforcement. For example, consider the following natural language
network policy statement:
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“It is inappropriate to run insecure protocols in the residence halls”.
When network administrators see this policy, there may be several questions that
will come up to their mind. First, what is the action that should be used to deal with traffic
that is insecure? In the policy statement, it mentions “inappropriate” but says nothing
about whether the network traffic should be blocked or not. Second, what does the term
“insecure protocols” mean? Although network administrators may have an idea about which
network protocols may be considered insecure, they may still have questions about whether
all these kinds of protocols should be considered. Third, what is the network information
that corresponds to physical buildings (i.e., residence halls)? Or, more specifically, what IP
address range represents “the residence halls”? Such questions not only provide insights into
the concerns that network administrators may have during the actual enforcement process,
but also reflect the ambiguities of the policy itself. With such information, policymakers
can rewrite the ambiguous network policy statement, still keeping it as a comparatively
high-level description but make it more understandable to the network administrators.
In this chapter, we introduce our proposed Network Policy Analyzer system that can
determine whether a given network policy statement contains ambiguous terms and whether
any important information required for the enforcement is missing. The approach is driven
by the recent advances in Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques. With the help of
NLP techniques, a network policy statement can be fragmented into small pieces including
the pattern of the network traffic described in the policy and the action to perform on the
targeted traffic.
3.2

Relating Network Policy Statements to Network Policy Enforcement

Network administrators care about what network traffic to deal with and what actions
to perform on the targeted traffic. Knowing how to extract related information from
the network policy statements and map it to a well-structured format that can be fully
understood by the network administrators is important.
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3.2.1

The Principles Behind Information Collection

Network policies must eventually be translated into low-level network configurations. But
what do these configurations look like on a network device? Consider the following access
control rule on a Cisco device that uses Access Control List to block the ftp traffic:
router# access-list 101 deny tcp any any eq ftp [23]
In this rule, the access list named 101 is used to deny the traffic from any source
to any destination address with destination port number equals to ftp port (port 21). The
basic format of this rule consists of an action, (deny in this case) and the other fields to
match the network traffic. The 5-Tuple, which includes source IP address, source port,
destination IP address, destination port, and the transport layer protocol, is commonly
used to match the traffic. Recent advances in SDN make it possible to enrich the packet
header fields that can be used for the match as well as the actions that can be taken. For
example, OpenFlow version 1.5 allows more than 40 flow matching fields [88]. It makes the
devices capable of dealing with various types of network traffic.
Based on the format of the rule a network policy will be translated into, we list five
questions that network administrators would ask when enforcing the policy.
• What is the description of the network traffic in the policy? The description
is essential since it has to be translated into the 5-Tuple or even more diverse matching
fields in the rule. Furthermore, some types of network traffic are described using the
“amount” other than the values in the packet headers. If the description is ambiguous,
network administrators will find it difficult to put the correct/exact values in the
matching fields or to use other tools to detect the specified traffic. As a result, the
implementation may be incomplete if it deals with fewer traffic types than expected,
or it will incorrectly deal with more types of network traffic than the ones described
in the policy statements. Such “overkill” will of course influence the normal use of
the network.
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• What is the action to take on the matching flow? There are various actions
that may occur in the network policies. The basic actions include allow(permit) or
block(deny) that address the security issues of the network. However, because network
policies are high-level statements, the words “allow or block” do not necessarily
directly appear in the policies. For example, “It is inappropriate to run BitTorrent
applications on campus”.

This policy does not specify the action, and network

administrators need to guess whether the word “inappropriate” means “blocking”
such traffic. Other actions such as rate-limit or route-to can be also implied by the
policy. Network administrators need to find out whether it is correct to use such
actions for the implementation. Besides the content of the action, some policies may
describe how long these actions should last. In other words, it is the duration of the
rule. SDN rules have an optional field called timeout to specify the duration that a
rule should exist after being inserted to the switches.
• Which location of the network resources should be focused on? Network
administrators need to consider on which devices the configurations/rules should be
set up. If no location information is mentioned in the policy, network administrators
may wonder about the scope the policies apply to. Considering the fact that the
network policies focused on in this chapter are mainly university network policies,
we can roughly think of the locations as either on-campus or off-campus. For those
policies about on-campus network resources, which network devices (e.g, switches and
routers) should the rules be placed on? For the traffic that flows between on-campus
locations and off-campus locations, what rules should be placed on the Firewalls?
The location information not only determines where the rules are to be placed but
also the relevant information to be placed in the description match. For example, if
locations such as “campus residential network” are mentioned, network administrators
may think about (1) whether they should set up rules on each switch/router on the
campus residential network and (2) the IP address range that represents campus
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residential network since it will appear as either the source or destination address in
the matching fields of the rule.
• What is the direction of the network traffic? The 5-Tuple contains source
and destination address or ports which explicitly requires the direction of the traffic
to be considered. The direction can be either single-way or bi-directional based on
the interpretation of the policies. For example, some policies that mention specific
protocol names have directions implied by the port number (destination) used by the
protocol. Other policies differ in the direction part based on the context.
• Whether network state information is required for the match?

This

question, along with traffic direction, is closely related to the description of the
network traffic. We give examples of the network policies in which network traffic
is described using the protocol names (e.g. FTP ). For this type of network traffic, the
corresponding low-level details are known beforehand and can be translated into the
5-Tuple. However, if a policy talks about traffic like “port scanning traffic”, it cannot
be described simply by the 5-Tuple since it requires the network state information that
counts the number of network connections from the same source to different ports over
time. To deal with such policies, network administrators need to understand what
network state information is available to them and which sophisticated tools, such
as intrusion detection systems they can use to capture such traffic. Nowadays, many
network devices have the ability to detect traffic on a higher layer such as the traffic
generated by different applications. For example, a layer-7 switch is a switch that
not only possesses the basic switching/routing capabilities as other devices but also
collects the information on the application layer. As a result, rules can be set up
saying “Route the traffic in this way based on the content of the HTTP requests”.
It is important to understand what functionalities are provided by the tools that can
analyze the application layer behavior and the format of the output.
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3.2.2

The Selection of Tags for the NLP Model

Based on the principles discussed above, we show the tags that the NPA system uses to
train the NLP model that aims to retrieve all the valuable information from a given network
policy. The tags are placed in different categories with example values as shown in Table 3.1.
As has been discussed above, the key information that are required for the successful
enforcement include:
(1)The description of the network traffic
(2)The action to be taken on the observed traffic
(3)The location of the network to focus on
(4)The direction of the traffic and
(5)The network state information if known.
Here we discuss them separately and further divide them into different categories.
First, to illustrate the diverse patterns of the network policies that express the same intent,
consider the following group of policies:
“Port scanning is not allowed on the network.”
“Students should not scan the network with port scanners.”
“Applications such as port scanners are prohibited on the network.”
All these policies aim at the traffic generated by the behavior of port scan but use
different words/phrases to describe the intent. Considering the diversity of the policies, we
list example tags and values and categorize them. We assign either “.clear” or “.unclear”
to these terms to indicate whether they are considered ambiguous or not (see Table 3.1).
• TrafficDescription: Because network policies can be composed in various patterns,
NPA utilizes different types of tags to capture the content of the target network
traffic. The network traffic can be described using high-level terms such as “cleartext
protocols.” or, more specifically, the names of the protocols, such as “FTP ”. The
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Category

TrafficDescription

Example Tags
Protocol.unclear
Protocol.clear
P2P.unclear
P2P.clear
Scan.unclear
Scan.clear
Unauthorized.unclear
App/Devices.unclear
Amountmany.unclear

TrafficAmount

TrafficDirection

Action

Bandwidth.clear
AmountUnit.clear
DirectionADJ.clear
DirectionPREP.clear
AuxNot.clear
NegativeNoun.clear
NegativeVerb.clear
NegativeADJ.unclear
PositiveVerb.clear
Action.clear

ActionDuration

Action.unclear
DurationUnit.clear
NetworkLocation.clear

Location
Resources.unclear

Exception

Firewall.clear
Condition.clear
PolicyException.clear

Other

Examples
Traffic
People
Comparison
Tools
Equipment

Example Values
Cleartext protocol, insecure protocol
ftp, telnet, rlogin
Peer-to-peer, p2p, file sharing
BitTorrent, eDonkey
Security scan, vulnerability scan
Port scan
Unauthorized, personal
Application, program,
Software, device
Excessive, many, disproportionate,
High portion
Bandwidth, capacity
Mbps, Gbps, MB, GB
inbound/outbound, internal/external,
From/to {NetworkLocation.clear}
Must not, may not, should not
Violation, abuse, misuse, prohibition
Prohibited, forbidden
Inappropriate, improper, unsuitable
Allowed, permitted
Ban, disable, terminate, block,
not {PositiveVerb.clear}
Restrict, limit, constrain
Second, minute, hour
Campus/university network,
Data network, residence hall,
Computer labs, Internet
Computing resources,
Information systems
Firewall, perimeter
Unless, except
Prior notification/authorization,
Approval
Examples of, such as, for example
Network traffic, packet, flow
Students, staff, employees
Not, other than, greater/less than
Packet sniffers, network monitor
Switch, hub, router,
wireless access point

Table 3.1: Tags for Named Entity Recognition in NPA
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use of such high-level terms without explanation will increase the ambiguities in the
policies and they are tagged as “.unclear” Besides the protocol names, the traffic
content can also be inferred through the behavior implicitly. The behavior usually
consists of a verb and a noun in syntax depicting “do something.” and the consequence
of the behavior is the generation of the traffic network administrators want to take
action on. So in this category, we mainly focus on the traffic that is closely related to
5-tuples which can be either represented using the port number or the IP address.
• TrafficAmount:

Some types of network policies focus on the traffic that is

represented by the amount of the traffic. For example, the traffic that is related
to bandwidth usage. The adjectives used to describe bandwidth usage are often
ambiguous as they do not have a specific number for clarification. For example, in the
phrase “a disproportionate amount of network bandwidth”, how do people know their
usage is disproportionate? So these ambiguous adjectives are tagged as “.unclear”.
Besides these adjectives, if the policy mentions specific numbers that explain how
the bandwidth is classified as “excessive”, such as greater than 1Gbps, NPA can also
recognize these numbers along with the unit. Network administrators can set the
value as a filter and find the traffic that consumes excessive network bandwidth.
• Traffic Direction: The direction of the traffic is also important since it determines
whether the collected IP address and port numbers will be used as the source or
the destination. We collected some commonly used adjectives such as “inbound/outbound” and preposition phrases such as “from. . . to. . . ” that may represent the
direction of network traffic for the implementation.
• Action: Network policies are written in purely human-readable natural language.
This nature determines that the keywords can be replaced by synonyms to express
similar meanings. It has to be clear what specific action should be placed in the rules
that implement the policies. However, clear actions such as “allow”, “block”, or “rate
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limit” do not necessarily directly appear in the policies. The action sometimes has
to be inferred depending on the “tone” of the policy, which is closely related to the
words (verbs, adjectives, and adverbs) that are used in the policy. The uncertainty of
the inference increases the ambiguities. We list these words or phrases and assign the
tags based on their attributes and whether they are clear or not.
• Action Duration:

When the action of the rule is determined, the duration of

the action is another option to consider. By default, if the duration is not specified,
the rule is considered effective permanently until changes are made. The specific
“timeout” can be declared along with the action to specify how long the action of the
rule will exist.
• Location: Network policies can be either explicit or implicit on where the rules
should be placed. The university firewall is a unique location where various rules
are set up to protect the internal campus resources. Typically, universities have
separate documents titled “Firewall Policies” that centrally manage the policies to
be implemented at the firewalls. Besides the specific location such as the firewall
mentioned above, network policies may also have implications on the location. The
university network is composed of various sub-networks, which means that a feasible
solution is to place the rule on the border switch/router that manages the subnet.
For example, if “residence hall” appears in a network policy, the low-level details such
as the subnet IP address of the residence hall may be used in the description of the
traffic as well to illustrate the traffic to or from that location.
• Exception: Some network policies are considered “flexible” since they have exceptions when certain conditions are triggered. NPA can capture conditional words
such as “unless” and explicit exceptions. Network administrators can consider it as
additional information for when they should deal with the mentioned network traffic
differently.
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• Other: The tags and values in this category are generally used as the support for NPA
to better understand the patterns of the network policies so that no useful information
is missed. We only listed a few in the table, but these recognized words may be useful
to network administrators for the implementation. For example, if a policy focuses
on the student group, network administrators can set up rules that only affect that
group.
3.3

System Architecture

Network Policy Analyzer (NPA) is a system that utilizes the recent advances in NLP to
analyze the quality of network policies written in natural language. The main components of
NPA include the entity extraction module, and the policy analyzing module. After network
administrators use network policy documents as input to NPA, the system will generate a
quality report for all the policies in the input file, showing whether they are well-written
or not based on the detected ambiguous (or missing) terms they have in each group. The
architecture of NPA is shown in Figure 3.1
3.3.1

The Entity Extraction Module

Named Entity Recognition (NER) is one of the sub-tasks in the field of Natural Language
Processing. The purpose of NER is to extract useful information from any given text and
map the extracted information into pre-defined tags so the system understands that the
specific term is in the text and it belongs to a specific category. Currently, there are many
mature NLP libraries that can be used. For example, NLTK [89] and DialogFlow [38] come
with pre-trained models that can recognize entities such as the name of a person, a city,
and so on. However, these models do not perform quite well on domain-specific information
extraction. Taking network policy analysis, for example, the use of network domain-specific
terms, various patterns of the policies makes it difficult to extract the information accurately
with the pre-trained models. To achieve a high detection accuracy, these libraries utilize
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Figure 3.1: NPA System Architecture
large amounts of training examples for specific purposes. We do not find any existing corpus
in the area of network policies.
Systems like NPA have requirements on the accuracy of the extracted information
since this is the very first step to analyze the quality of a written network policy.
We collected real-world network policies from various university websites and manually
annotated them. They are then used to train the Named Entity Recognition (NER) model.
The goal NPA wants to achieve is to check whether there is any ambiguous or missing
element in a network policy that will create ambiguities for network administrators when
they enforce the policy. Based on the need, we add either “clear” or “unclear” as the postfix
to some training tags of the NLP model. As has been discussed in the previous section, the
training tags have been categorized based on the criteria required to know the quality of a
written policy. This process is essential since it makes it convenient for NPA to process the
extracted information. It checks each category for ambiguity and puts them together as a
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network policy quality report indicating what should be modified and improved.
3.3.2

The Policy Analyzing Module

Users of NPA input network policies. Once the entity extraction module finishes extracting
the information from the policies, the entities along with the tags will be passed to the policy
analyzing module to generate the quality report for the input network policy document. The
policy analyzing module deals with the entities using a set of rules and the procedure it
follows is shown in Algorithm 1.
The procedure takes three inputs, namely the network policy text, the extracted
entities along with the tags and the pre-defined groups these tags belong to. The entities
are extracted in the same order as they appear in the network policies. The procedure checks
for each group whether there is any recognized entity with a tag that ends with “.unclear”
and appends the entity to the result of that group. Once the procedure goes through all the
extracted entities, it formulates the report for each group and checks the pre-defined groups
for the missing elements. Note, NPA considers the groups of direction, exception, and other
as optional groups. These groups do not necessarily need to appear in the network policies
but if they do appear, NPA is able to recognize them. Network traffic can be described
using the terms in the TrafficDescription group or the TrafficAmount group. NPA checks
the ambiguity of these groups if they exist and assumes that there is no missing value for
the description of the traffic. But for the action group and the location group, NPA checks
both groups for both ambiguous and missing values. Based on the ambiguous terms and
missing elements detected, NPA generates a policy quality report showing whether the input
network policy is well-written or not. In the report, a detailed analysis for each group is
also presented for the users to understand why a policy needs improvement. It provides a
convenient way for the users to locate the problematic part of the policy.

59

Algorithm 1 GenerateQualityReportForPolicy
1: procedure getReport(Entities, P olicy, Groups)
2:
for entity ∈ Entities do
3:
if entity.tag contains “.unclear” then
4:
T ext = “The term {entity.text} is unclear”
5:
group = Groups.findTag(entity.tag)
6:
group.quality = 0
7:
group.report.append(T ext)
8:
else if entity.tag contains “Protocol.clear” then
9:
group = Groups.findTag(entity.tag)
10:
group.quality = 1
11:
group.report.clear()
12:
direction.quality =1
13:
direction.report.append(“implied by {entity}”)
14:
else
15:
group = Groups.findTag(entity.tag)
16:
group.quality = 1 AND group.quality
17:
end if
18:
end for
19:
for group in [action, location] do
20:
if group.quality = 0 then
21:
overallQuality = 0
22:
Report.append(group.report)
23:
else if group.quality = None then
24:
overallQuality = 0
25:
Report.append(“{group} is missing”)
26:
end if
27:
end for
28:
if overallQuality = 0 then
29:
Report.prepend(“Policy needs improvement.”)
30:
Return policyReport
31:
else
32:
Report.prepend(“Policy is well written.”)
33:
Return Report
34:
end if
35: end procedure
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3.4

Implementation and Evaluation of NPA

In this section, we discuss the data and the processes that NPA takes to train the Named
Entity Recognition (NER) model. Evaluation results are provided based on the metrics such
as F1 score, precision, and recall. We also show the use cases for various types of network
policies and provide suggestions on how to write network policies with fewer ambiguities.
3.4.1

Collecting and Screening Network Policies

Universities typically publish network Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) documents publicly
available online. These documents are given different titles based on the content. For
example, policies about network security are listed in network/information security AUPs.
Policies about wireless devices will be posted in wireless device AUPs. However, not all the
policies listed in the AUPs are related to network traffic, especially those policies targeting
password and encryption are difficult to analyze.
We focused on the network policies that describe the generation of network traffic.
We first investigated general network policy documents from several university websites
and then picked the ones that involved network traffic generation. After we had an initial
categorization of the policies, we then googled these categories on different university
websites.

As a result, we finally collected 300 network policies in total from various

university websites by taking out the ones that fit into the categories from the AUPs of each
university. We categorized the policies based on their topics and the number of policies for
each category is shown in Table 3.2.
We first downloaded the web pages that contained these policies and saved them as
local files. For some websites that disabled text selection, we wrote a program to convert
them into text files so that our applications could read the content of those files. Each
policy is composed of either one or two sentences. The collected dataset has 7303 total
words, and 1253 of them are unique.
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Category
P2P File Sharing
Port Scanning/Probing
Network Monitoring
Network Service/Disruption
Firewall
Bandwidth Usage
Unauthorized IP
Unauthorized Devices
Games
Insecure Protocols
Domain Registration

Number of Policies
20
45
25
30
10
45
25
70
5
20
5

% of Total (300)
6.67%
15%
8.33%
10%
3.33%
15%
8.33%
23.33%
1.67%
6.67%
1.67%

Table 3.2: Number of Network Policies in Different Categories
3.4.2

NLP Training

We first manually annotated the policies using the tags discussed in the previous section. We
preprocessed and generated the data into a format that could be recognized by spaCy [90],
the NLP library we used to train the model. There are other NLP libraries there but we
chose spaCy as it provides an easy API for users to prepare the training data and performs
fast in Name Entity Recognition (NER).
We divided the data, e.g, the collected network policies into the training and
validation sets using different ratios to see how the ratio would affect the accuracy of the
system. Then we used the CLI tool provided by spaCy version 3 to train the model and to
evaluate the validation set. The best models were saved for further testing. A difference
between spaCy version 3 and previous versions is that we can set up different variables(e.g.,
batch size, dropout) inside a config file and use that file in a single command for the
training. The results were returned in a table showing the metrics such as precision, recall,
F1 score and NER Losses for each training epoch. In general, the values of precision, recall,
and F1 score increase while the value of NER Losses decreases. SpaCy CLI includes an
early stop function that stops the training process before the model overfits. We plot the
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terminal results in Figure 3.2 showing the typical training results with batch size equals
to 16 and dropout ratio equals to 0.3. The optimizer used was Adam V1, with a learning
rate of 0.001. The data were randomly divided into 80%-20% for the training set(240) and
validation set(60).

Figure 3.2: Precision, Recall, F1 score and NER Losses for a Single Training
Because we only have 300 total samples, which is small for machine learning, we
divided the data using different ratios and checked whether the training results would be
improved as more data was used as the training set. We divided the data using 60%-40%,
70%-30%, 80%-20%, 90%-10% for the training/validation set and ran 20 tests for each
division. The results shown in Table 3.3 indicate that with larger numbers of network
policies as the training set, the overall F1 score NPA increases.
3.4.3

Accuracy of the Policy Quality Report

Entity extraction is only the first step toward generating a quality report for the input
network policy. The metrics shown above explain how well NPA can extract the important
terms and phrases from policies, but not how accurate the final reports are. We evaluate
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Metrics/Ratios
Average F1
Highest
Lowest

60%-40%
0.7952
0.8148
0.7673

70%-30%
0.8179
0.8430
0.7933

80%-20%
0.8260
0.8738
0.7972

90%-10%
0.8383
0.8915
0.8026

Table 3.3: Entity Extraction Results: Average Metrics for Entity Extraction during 20
Tests with Different Training Samples using Batch Size=16 and Dropout=0.3
the accuracy of the quality report generated by NPA in Table 3.4. A policy quality report
is made up of the assessment and the details. The assessment answers whether the policy
is well-written or needs to be improved. The accuracy was calculated by comparing how
many assessments generated by NPA were exactly the same as the ones generated by us
manually. The details include the analysis of the entities based on the groups they fall into.
We evaluated each section in the quality report using the percentage of the appearance of
the correct statements(i.e., our manual annotations vs. using the NLP model). The ground
truth statements were the ones generated using our manual annotations and they were used
to compare with the results of the NPA system to see whether they were exactly the same.
If so, they were considered “correct” statements. We conducted 20 tests and each test
evaluated 60 validation policies that were randomly selected.
As the results indicate, the accuracy of the assessment is 95%. NPA generates
the assessment based on any existence of ambiguous or missing terms in the groups of
description, action, and location. The high assessment accuracy is due in large part to
the fact that most policies have some ambiguity in one of those key three fields, and we
accurately detect the ambiguity in one of the three fields in 95% of the cases. The individual
accuracies of TrafficDescription, TrafficAmount, action, location and direction remain above
80%, while the accuracy of other, which represented the terms or phrases that were not
technical or domain-specific is comparatively low. Erroneous extraction may occur across
groups, e.g, a term recognized incorrectly into a wrong group, which will influence the
accuracy of both groups. The results also indicate that terms in the group other are not
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Quality Report Sections
Assessment
TrafficDescription
TrafficAmount
Action
Location
Direction
PolicyException
Other

Total Appearance
1200
1200
180
1200
1200
306
225
249

Accuracy(%)
95.0
86.21
85.37
88.32
85.04
84.66
92.0
73.42

Table 3.4: Average Accuracy for Different Sections in the Quality Report
recognized as accurately as other groups by NPA.
3.5

Network Policies and Use Cases

In this section, we illustrate the use of NPA by providing examples of output quality reports
for various network policies. We used displacy, a visualizer of the spaCy library to render
the results in Jupyter Notebook. NPA outputs the quality reports of the input network
policies, which contain ambiguous terms and missing groups.
3.5.1

Ambiguity in Traffic Description and Amount

3.5.1.1

Policies about Protocols

In a network policy, the traffic that network administrators need to deal with can usually be
described clearly with low-level packet header information (say the 5-tuple). However, the
”description” in the network policy often contain high-level terms that cause ambiguities.
There are a significant number of network policies that are intended to describe
network protocols but do not mention the specific protocol names. This causes ambiguities
since network administrators may need to guess which protocols the policy refers to and
whether they are exactly the ones network policy writers are talking about. For example,
consider the following two network policies:
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“Superseded or insecure protocols and cipher suites should not be used unless
there is an approved exception in place” [91]
“P2P applications are not allowed on the University of Memphis network.” [92]
We can notice that the first policy focuses on the protocols and cipher suites that
are “superseded or insecure”. Network administrators may have questions about which
protocols and cipher suites are considered “superseded or insecure”.
We show the NPA output for the first policy about insecure protocols and cipher
suites in Figure 3.3. The word “superseded” is not recognized by NPA since it only appears
once in the entire dataset. This also reflects that we need more training data to increase the
system’s accuracy. NPA considers the uncontracted modal verbs such as must not, should
not, may not as the same while in fact, according to RFC 2119 [93], there is still a difference
in the requirement levels of these keywords. NPA prints the detailed debug information for
each element group of the policy. This policy does not mention anything about the network
location, and also it has the word “unless,” which makes this policy a conditional policy.
Similarly, in the second policy, the subject is “P2P applications”. The output of
the NPA system for this policy is shown in Figure 3.4. Unlike the previous policy, the action
and location in this policy are quite clear, while only the description part has problems. As
a result, NPA also considers it an ambiguous policy.
To demonstrate policies that are well-written, consider the following two policies.
“Applications which transmit sensitive information over the network in clear
text, such as telnet and ftp, are prohibited and will be blocked.” [2]
“The University Wireless Network should not be used inappropriately; in
particular you should not use the network to: run peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing
software, e.g., BitTorrent.” [3]
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Figure 3.3: NPA Output for a Policy about Insecure Protocols

Figure 3.4: NPA Output for a Policy about P2P Applications
Due to space limitations, we only show the NPA output for the first of the above
two policies in Figure 3.5. The first policy uses specific protocol names as the subjects or
examples for the explanation so that the description becomes clear.
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Figure 3.5: NPA Output for a Policy about FTP and Telnet
3.5.1.2

Policies about Bandwidth Usage

Network bandwidth is a shared resource. If some users overuse the network bandwidth,
it may potentially degrade the performance and affect others. Universities have policies
that regulate bandwidth usage. However, many policies have ambiguous descriptions about
the “threshold” that will cause violations. Consider the following policy that mentions
bandwidth:
“Providing services or running applications which consumes excessive bandwidth
on the HMS network without authorization is prohibited.” [94]
The action and network location in this policy are clear. It is also conditional
where “getting the authorization” is an exception for the policy. NPA detects the word
“excessive”, and thinks it to be unclear. From the perspectives of network administrators,
they will have questions about when to take action or to what extent the bandwidth usage
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of a user will degrade the network performance of other users. The NPA output for this
policy is shown in Figure 3.6.

Figure 3.6: NPA Output for a Policy about Bandwidth Usage
3.5.1.3

Policies about Network Scanning

Scanning the network is an approach to get information about the network, such as “which
host is active?” and “which port is open?” Nmap [95] is considered as one of the most
commonly used tools to perform network scanning. Due to security issues, university policies
often restrict or disallow such behavior. Consider the following port scanning policy:
“Port scanning or security scanning is expressly prohibited unless prior
notification to Information Technology Security is made.” [8]
The NPA output for this policy is shown in Figure 3.7. The action is clear while
the location is missing. The policy is also conditional where making notification to the
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ITS will be considered as an exception. NPA detects two phrases, “port scanning” and
“security scanning”. “Port scanning” is a well-known term which is a behavior of sending
network traffic to different ports to detect which ports are open, while the scope for the term
“security scanning” can be large. As a result, network administrators may wonder which
behavior is considered as “security scanning” and what type of network will be generated?
The ambiguities increase the risk of false enforcement.

Figure 3.7: NPA Output for a Policy about Network Scanning
3.5.2

Ambiguity in Action

Unlike the low-level network configurations, which may explicitly contain actions such as
block, allow or rate limit, network policies written in natural language may not necessarily
contain these words. The use of verbs or even adjectives may sometimes represent an unclear
action to be taken on the targeted traffic. Consider the following policy with an ambiguous
action and the associated NPA output for this policy in Figure 3.8.
“The use of telnet is ordinarily unnecessary and not recommended.” [96]
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Figure 3.8: NPA Output for a Policy about the Use of Telnet
This policy is relatively short. The target of the network traffic is clear, which is the
telnet protocol. However, the policy uses an unclear adjective “unnecessary” to describe
the protocol and uses “not recommended” to express the “attitude” toward it. Network
administrators will be confused about the policy since they do not know exactly whether
they should block the telnet traffic or not if they observe it. Consequently, NPA thinks
the policy to be ambiguous based on the two ambiguous terms detected. The location is
missing as well.
Such ambiguous terms for the action can be found in some other network policies.
Below are two example policies with unclear actions. The highlighted terms are considered
weak in a formal network policy statement. These ambiguous terms will increase ambiguities
since they do not provide enough information to the network administrators on what actions
to take on the traffic types mentioned in the policy.
“Grenfell Campus cannot make any assurance of privacy for data that is
sent over the Internet. We recommend that you watch for secure web pages
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(“https”, and a padlock-icon) whenever you transmit sensitive information.
Instead of “telnet”, consider ”ssh” to log onto remote servers.” [97]
“Users of telnet, rlogin, ftp, and other connectivity programs may not realize
that their password and data is transmitted across the network unencrypted and
can be intercepted by hackers. Use of these ”clear text” protocols is therefore
strongly discouraged.” [98]
3.5.3

Ambiguity in Location

Some examples shown above mention “Location is missing” in the quality reports of the
network policies. This is because the scope of the policies is not mentioned. For some
policies, even if the location appears, network administrators still find it difficult to enforce
the policy due to the ambiguity of the terms used. Consider the following policy with an
imprecise location specification:
“The use of peer-to-peer file sharing applications on Campbell University
computing resources is strictly prohibited.” [99]
We can see in the policy that “Campbell University computing resources” is
mentioned.

However, this phrase is ambiguous as it does not explain whether such

“resources” include all the resources such as computers in the labs or residence halls and
whether it applies to the resources off-campus. Network administrators need to consider
different cases separately, which increases the difficulties for the enforcement. The output
of NPA for this policy is shown in Figure 3.9. Similar to the examples that have “unclear”
description, the phrase “peer-to-peer file sharing applications” is ambiguous but the action
“prohibited” is clear.
3.6

Suggestions on Writing Good Network Policy

We propose suggestions on how the network policies composed contain fewer ambiguities.
The goal of these suggestions is to benefit all the stakeholders of network policies. Network
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Figure 3.9: NPA Output for a Policy with Ambiguous Location Information
administrators will have less confusion during the enforcement process. Users of the network,
potentially the readers of the policies, may also understand the violations better and use
the network resources properly.
• Add Examples for Better Explanation.

In the use cases, we showed that

phrases like “Insecure protocols” and “P2P applications” may confuse the network
administrators. If examples such as “FTP and Telnet”, or “BitTorrent” are added
to explain these phrases, the policies will become much clearer for enforcement. This
general suggestion also applies to other sections of the policies reflected by the quality
report.
• Use Strong Terms for Action. Some policies do not clearly state the actions to
be taken to implement the policies. Network administrators will be confused whether
they should “allow or block” such traffic. Terms or phrases such as “must not” or
“prohibited” are expected to appear in the policies so that network administrators
will have no doubt about the action.
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• Define the Policy Scope. NPA output shows “location is missing” for several
policies in the use cases above. People may have questions about whether the policies
apply to all the network resources or only a small portion of them. It is helpful
if the scope of the policy is defined. For example, a policy document can define
“The policy applies to the entire campus network” at the beginning where people
will understand the scope. At the same time, if the location is specified in the policy,
check the terms that are used. Terms such as “computing resources” and “information
systems” are ambiguous. The first suggestion would apply that examples are provided
for the explanation. For example, “computing resources refer to all the computers oncampus” so that network administrators can understand that they need to manage
the on-campus network.
• Provide Support for Exception. Many network policies have exceptions since certain behavior will become allowable under special conditions. Approval/authorization
from the University ITS is necessary to make this happen. However, if the policy is
available online, it should be clear how to make such requests. In the policies with
exceptions, there should be additional links showing the process of how to fill out the
requests either in forms or emails. Thus, it will be clear to network users they are
following the policies and for network administrators, they know whether to see and
review such requests.
• Avoid the Ambiguous Conditions.

Some network policies have ambiguous

conditions. For example, the use of phrases such as “whenever possible”, “if necessary”
undoubtedly increases the ambiguities of the policies. Avoid the use of such terms or
phrases and clearly specify the conditions.
3.7

Discussion

In this chapter, we presented Network Policy Analyzer, a system that can analyze the quality
of written natural language network policies. Network policymakers can take advantage of
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the NPA output to improve the policies and reduce the possibility of confusion when network
administrators enforce the policies. However, there are some improvements that NPA can
make and extend in the future.
Lack of training examples: In NPA, the total number of sample network policies
is 300. This number is considered insufficient in the field of machine learning. This is also
mentioned by the spaCy command-line tool when we train the NLP model. In Figure 3.10,
spaCy suggests using at least 2000 examples for the training. More network policies need
to be collected as training examples so that the accuracy of NPA can increase.

Figure 3.10: SpaCy Debug Data Result
The influence of NPA on policy implementation: NPA checks whether a
network policy is well-written based on the ambiguous or missing terms in the policy
statement. However, there is still a step toward the fully automatic implementation of the
network policies. This is because of the diverse types of network traffic that may appear
in the network and the tools available to the network administrators to detect the network
traffic. For example, if a network policy talks about specific protocols, the low-level details
can be recorded in prepared alias files so that the implementation can be fully automatic.
This is clear since we know the characteristics of such traffic in advance. But what if, we
do not know the traffic type or what tools can be used to capture traffic. Consider the
following network policy:
“Students are not allowed to install personal wireless routers on campus.”

75

The question remains there “what is the traffic that network operators should deal
with for this policy?” Another example is:
“Denial-of-Sevice attacks are expressly prohibited.”
So what tools can network administrators use to find out the network traffic
generated by the behavior of “Denial-of-Service attacks”? Some switches/ routers may
have application layer functions to detect such traffic while others do not. We need an extra
mechanism to map the network traffic and the corresponding tools to use for detection. For
example, if network administrators use the Snort IDS, there should be a mapping between
the alert output in Snort and the related network traffic type. Thus the IDS output can be
used for further processing, resulting in a fully automatic implementation of the network
policies.
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Chapter 4:

NPCE: A Chatbot to Check Network Policy Violations

As discussed in earlier sections, network security policies include high-level directives that
help keep an organization’s network secure.

These policies are composed by various

Policy Committees and recorded in network policy documents in the format of humanreadable natural language. Network operators come up with detailed configurations for
network devices, such as switches and routers, to enforce the policies, which satisfy the
organization’s security requirements.

However, this process is typically manual where

network operators need to understand the policy documents and make the translations
by themselves. Considering the fact that computer networks are evolving at a fast pace
nowadays, it is even more difficult for network operators to correctly enforce the policies
due to the complexity of the network as well as the misinterpretation of policy documents
and other human errors in the translation process. Furthermore, members of the Policy
Committees often lack sufficient domain-specific knowledge in the networking area which
makes it difficult for them to evaluate whether network policies are correctly enforced. The
low-level details such as the characteristics of network traffic and the syntax of the database
queries can prevent them from generating the correct queries to get the answer about the
current status of the network.
In this chapter, we introduce the design and implementation of a system called
Network Policy Conversation System (NPCE) which takes advantage of the advances in
(1) Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to better understand a network policy
and (2) network traffic capturing techniques to collect the network traffic and (3) modern
database solutions to store the collected network traffic. Users of the system are expected
to be able to ask any question related to the network status, whether it is a question about
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the general statistics of network behaviors, or a specific question about whether a network
policy has been violated. NPCE provides a natural language mapping layer that can extract
and refine the useful information inside the questions from the users and the system is able
to build the correct database queries based on the extracted information. After the query
is generated, NPCE issues it to the network traffic database and gets the query response
in the raw data format. Based on the extracted information from the user’s questions, the
system analyzes what specific answer the users want and sends exactly the answer to what
they are interested in.
4.1

Motivation

Translating network policies into network configurations that enforce the policy with 100%
accuracy is almost impossible. In other words, there will be traffic that gets through
that is not compliant with the network policies. This can occur because the network
configuration mechanisms are not able to fully implement the policy, meaning the network
hardware/software is not able to support the policy. In addition, network configurations
are often large in scope and complexity which greatly increases the potential for errors
to be introduced in the translation process. Moreover, as noted earlier, the potential for
misinterpretation of a policy can also occur if it is not well-written. All of the above results
in non-compliant traffic being allowed to enter/traverse the network.
As a result, it is critically important to be able to examine the network traffic to see
if there is any traffic that violates the network policies. Network administrators (and also
possibly non-technical Network Policy writers) need tools to be able to ask questions about
the traffic that is traversing the network to see if any non-compliant traffic is present.
Note that there are tools to monitor network traffic and alert operators to traffic
that might be concerning. However, these tools are not designed to help answers questions
about network policy compliance and tend to focus more on potential attacks and threats
to the network. IDS tools such as Snort, Suricata, and Zeek/Bro all have the ability to
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monitor network traffic for security issues. Snort, the oldest one among these three IDSs,
has the ability to alert network operators of potential security threats by looking at packet
traces and offers a wide range of modules that deal with various types of attack traffic,
many of the modules being contributed by the community. Zeek/Bro can log the network
traffic and categorizes them based on the protocols they use. Not only can Zeek/Bro identify
potential security threats, but it can monitor for unusual activity from normal processes and
detect when the network is not operating effectively. Suricata has its own ruleset and most
of which are compatible with Snort’s rules. The advantage of Suricata is the capability
of processing network traffic faster by using multi-threaded processes, while Snort only
supports single-threaded processes.
4.2

Design Goals

As has been discussed in the related work, there is no existing tool that can be directly
used by the network operators to check whether a policy violation occurred in the network.
If they choose to use an existing monitoring tool, they have to translate the network
policies into low-level packet capture specifications needed to collect and analyze the
network traffic for potential policy violations. Our goal, on the other hand, is to design
a system that can (1) understand policy violation questions from network operators, (2)
capture the network traffic required to answer policy violation questions, and store the
collected traffic information, including packet headers and flow statistics in a searchable
database/analytics engine, and (3) provide a mechanism to automatically translate the
policy violation questions into database queries to fetch the answer from the network traffic
database. With such a system, users can directly ask policy violation questions using natural
language, and the intelligent system will answer them.
The gap between policy violation questions written in natural language and the
corresponding low-level database queries is huge. Consequently, it is a significant challenge
to translate network policy violation questions into packet capture specifications to be
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used in the network management tools and ultimately into database queries to search for
violations. Ideally, the system should perform the translation process fully automatically.
To support the automatic translation of policy violation questions into packet capture and
database query specifications, we proposed a natural language mapping layer in the middle
to better understand what the network operators are asking about and how the useful
information should be used in the network management tools in the format of the low-level
details.
As an intermediary, the mapping layer should possess the following attributes:
1. The mapping layer should be able to recognize both the high-level natural language
terms as well as the terms with low-level details about traffic. Network policy questions
will often be written using high-level conceptual language rather than low-level packet
header terms. For example, a policy question may be written as ”Is there any web
traffic?”, when the more precise low-level question would be ”Is there any port 80
traffic?” The mapping layer should be able to capture both terms such as “web traffic”
and “port 80 traffic” so that no matter how the questions are asked, it can give an
answer.
2. The mapping layer should be able to return the type of information the user is
expecting rather than the raw network traffic data. We continue using the example
“Is there any web traffic?”. Suppose the system finds all the web traffic from the
database, the system should not return all the data to the user since that is not what
the user is expecting. In this particular example, the user is expecting the amount of
web traffic based on the phrase “Is there any”. So the system should be able to parse
the raw network traffic data and return only “Yes or No” based on the count of such
traffic.
3. The mapping layer should have a clear categorization so that the system will
understand which parts of the question are not needed and which parts of the question
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should appear in the body of a database query. The logic behind this attribute is
important in that not every word in the question is useful. For example, “Can you
let me know the amount of FTP traffic?”. In this question, “Can you let me know” is
absolutely an irrelevant part of the question that should be neglected. Also based on
the fact that network management tools, including the network traffic database, use
ONLY the low-level details to manage or filter the traffic, the mapping layer should
filter out the parts of the question that should appear in these tools. In this case,
“FTP traffic” is the only information that should appear in the database query.
For capturing and storing network traffic, the principle is that it has access to all the
traffic (whether previously captured, or live traffic) and that it needs to be able to filter the
traffic to identify a specific flow or packet.
For the selection of databases, the requirements include (1) excellent search speed
and scalability and (2) a human-readable query language that eases the translation. One
goal of the system is to finally translate a natural language question into a database query.
Since we are expecting that the users may ask any type of question, the system should
provide a reliable mapping mechanism between the content of the questions and the format
of the database queries. In other words, if we consider the query with a single match
statement, the questions with additional information such as aggregation, comparison, and
logical negation should also have their own corresponding query templates for them to use
so that the system can automatically pick the correct query template based on the output
of the mapping layer.
4.3

Approach: Using NLP and Modern Database Solutions

In this section, we introduce the architecture of Network Policy Conversation Engine
(NPCE). We show the functionalities of each working module and discuss the workflow
of the system. As an important component of NPCE, the mapping layer determines the
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correctness of the interpretation of the question. We discuss the design of the mapping layer
and illustrate how it helps reduce the translation gap between the questions and queries.
4.3.1

System Architecture

To achieve the goals mentioned in the motivation section, the Network Policy Conversation
Engine (NPCE) is composed of three working modules, namely the question interpretation
module, the query generation module, and a network database. The architecture of NPCE
is shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: NPCE System Architecture
The Question Interpretation Module: Once NPCE takes the user’s policy
violation question as input, the first task of the system is to understand what is the valuable
information in the question. Fortunately, recent advances in Natural Language Processing
(NLP) provide us with opportunities to better understand natural language sentences in
a more systematic manner. Most notably, entity extraction is an important technique in
the NLP field. It aims to identify and extract the words or phrases that are determined
to be valuable based on a predefined entity set, which is a collection of tagged words or
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phrases used to train NPCE. In the predefined entity set, each entity value is given a label
of the entity type. For example, we may define “object” as the entity type for the word
“traffic”. The details of the entity set will be discussed in a later section. So each time
the system recognizes the word traffic, it understands that “traffic” is the “object” in the
question that the user is interested in. The entity extraction starts from the beginning of
the sentence which follows the order these entities appear. The order of these words can
be used to understand information such as what the direction of the network traffic is, or
more specifically whether the traffic is coming out of a device or entering an interface of a
switch. This is important since, in the most popular low-level identifiers such as the 5-tuple,
the value of IP address or the port number should be placed correctly in the corresponding
source or destination IP/port. Once NPCE understands where the traffic comes from, it
can label the detected IP or port numbers as either source or destination IP/port numbers.
We also defined lists of synonyms for each type of entity. When the user asks questions
using either the exact same word or phrase or similar ones, NPCE is able to recognize them,
which increases the expressiveness of the system.
The Query Generation Module: The Query Generation Module also plays a
role in converting the natural language questions into the corresponding database queries.
Taking the output from the Question Interpretation module as the input, the role of the
Query Generation module, as its name indicates, is responsible for the generation of the
corresponding database query. Based on the output from the Question Interpretation
module, the Query Generation module takes the extracted entities and places them in the
correct fields to form a database query. How the query will look like is totally dependent on
what entities have been extracted. For example, if NPCE detects the value of an IP address
of a server, along with the traffic direction to be incoming, the Query generation module will
place the resolved IP address in the field of the destination IP address within the 5-tuple.
Since the system prepares a template library for various extracted entity combinations, it
understands which query template to use based on which entities are extracted. The final
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output of this module to the database is a query that searches for a certain type of network
traffic or packet. It will issue the query to the database through REST API and wait for the
response. After receiving the response, the module parses the query response and processes
it using the information about what the user is expecting and returns to the users ONLY
what they ask about.
The Network Database: This subsystem actually involves two capabilities, the
ability to capture network traffic and the ability to store it. For traffic capture, many
tools have been developed to satisfy this purpose. Tools designed for capturing flows, such
as NetFlow, do processing on the flow-level. They aggregate the records of the packets
whose headers have the same value in the same field. By doing this, the tools provide
network operators with a higher view of what is happening in the network instead of giving
them information about the behavior of each packet. However, sometimes checking network
policy violations may require information on the packet-level. So tools such as Tcpdump
that capture every packet are helpful for analyzing the packet headers.
4.3.2

The Mapping Layer

As has been discussed in the motivation section, the mapping layer should help with the
understanding of the natural language questions as well as the generation of database
queries. It also provides guidelines for what entities should be trained and collected as
a predefined entity set for the Question Interpretation Module. Table 4.1 shows examples
of the identifiers and values in the mapping layer.
The Five W’s [100] is a concept that the system can use to ask questions to itself to
better understand the natural language sentences. In particular, it uses the following five
keywords (who, when, what, where, why). The questions the system can ask itself include
“What network information are we dealing with?” and “When and where does the network
event happen?”. We consider other information as descriptions.
The Object identifier covers the subject of the question, representing “what” we
are dealing with. The Device identifier specifies the place where network events actually
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Identifiers
Object
Device
Timestamp
Attribute
Protocol
Traffic Direction
Comparison Operator
Aggregation
Special Terms
Answer
Object Description
Device Description

Example Values
Traffic, Packet, Flow, Byte
Host, Switch, Router,
Firewall, Server, Printer
’in the last’ ’number’:value
(minute, hour, day, month )
<Protocol>, ’IP’:value, ’Port’:value
HTTP, FTP, BitTorrent, Telnet,
TFTP, Rlogin, DNS, DHCP
incoming, outgoing, bi-directional
equal to, greater than (or equal),
not equal to, less than (or equal)
max, min, average, count, unique count
the Internet, non-standard port, port scanning,
IP source routing, campus <Device>,
authorized <Protocol>servers, etc.
(True, False), the number of <Object>,
<Attribute>
<Attribute>, <Traffic Direction>,
<Comparison Operator>, <Aggregation>,
<Special Terms>
<Attribute>, <Comparison Operator>,
<Aggregation>, <Special Terms>

Table 4.1: Identifiers and example values of the mapping layer
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occurred, representing “where”, and the Timestamp identifier shows the time period,
representing “when”. If people include low-level identifiers such as the 5-tuple values in
the questions, these details will be considered as descriptions. They are covered by the
Object Description identifier and the Device Description identifier. Both identifiers involve
low-level network identifiers such as the protocol, the IP address, and the port number.
With the help of the information about traffic direction, they can be mapped to either
source or destination IP or port numbers. The Special Terms identifier represents the
high-level networking terms which can also be described using the corresponding low-level
network identifiers.
In the body of database queries, it is a fact that only the low-level identifiers will
show up. With the help of alias files, which we refer to as the files where the low-level details
of the special terms are recorded, the system can automate such translation processes. The
low-level details recorded in the alias file are fetched each time when the special terms are
recognized. As has been noted earlier, the questions are categorized into different groups.
The Answer identifier reflects the type of the answer to be returned to the users. Then we
only need to find the answer that matches the descriptions given in the Object Description
and the Device Description identifiers. We analyze the type of questions and categorize
them based on the answers they are expecting.
4.3.3

Tools for Implementation

We set up our topology in the Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) [101],
which is a platform that researchers can use to do experiments at scale. To implement
the Question Interpretation Module, we take advantage of the popular Natural Language
Understanding Platform, Google Dialogflow [38]. The reason we pick up Dialogflow out of
many other popular platforms is that it can be integrated with many popular messaging
applications so that users can use their cellphones to ask questions and check network policy
violations. The entity sets are trained in Dialogflow based on the identifier lists provided by
the mapping layer. We implement the Query Generation Module using Flask and store the
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network traffic in Elasticsearch [102], which is a fast and scalable search engine standing at
the core of the ELK stack [103]. The network traffic data is collected using both NetFlow
and Tcpdump and the log files of these tools are imported to Elasticsearch for analysis.
Dialogflow is a popular Natural Language Processing platform where users can train
their chatbot interfaces. The platform provides a user-friendly GUI where users can tag
the entities easily. Furthermore, it also comes with APIs with which users can write their
code and integrate the trained chatbot into other popular applications that people use daily.
These applications include but are not limited to messaging applications such as Facebook
Messenger, Slack, etc. We show an example Dialogflow interface where users can type
their training entities in Figure 4.2. Under the tag which is “object to measure”, users can
type in words along with their synonyms such as packets, bytes, and traffic. Besides using
synonyms, users can further use regular expressions to express the entities they want to
capture. The Dialogflow system also provides system default entities such as number and
date, so that users can directly tag and use them.

Figure 4.2: Dialogflow Entity Input Example (from https://dialogflow.cloud.google.com/)
Once the users have all the required entities, they continue training under the tab
“Intents”. An intent shows what users want to do. Users can train the example sentences
with different intents. An intent training example is show in Figure 4.3. In this example, the
name of the intent is “get user’s query” where users can put all the training examples here
that belong to this intent. If a user wants to know “the number of pkts in the network in
the last 30 minutes”, then they can manually select the terms or phrases and assign tags to
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them. Here, “the number of ” is considered as “counter”, “pkts” is the “object to measure”,
“in the network” is tagged as “devices”, which means all the switches and routers in the
network, and “last 30 min” is tagged as “time period” which further uses the system default
entity sys.date-time for processing. With enough training examples, the system will be able
to extract entities from users’ intents.

Figure 4.3: Dialogflow Intent Training (from https://dialogflow.cloud.google.com/)
Elasticsearch is a modern search and analytics platform. The combination use of
Elasticsearch and the database provides users with the opportunities to query the network
statistics and visualize the data using different dashboards. The log files of NetFlow and
TcpDump can be imported to Easticsearch using Beats [104] such as Filebeat [105] and
Packetbeat [106]. Besides the user-friendly interfaces, Elasticsearch also provides different
APIs for the users to query the data with their custom code. In Figure 4.4, we show
an example of how users can find whether there is any occurrence of an IP broadcast
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packet. The database is the NetFlow log file imported by Filebeat. Users can use tools
such as Ping [107] to send out a broadcast message to all the hosts in the network using
the broadcast address that ends with a “.255” in the IP address. NetFlow captures such
behavior and stores the data. Then in Elasticsearch, users can simply set the destination
address and the time period as the filters and find the result.

Figure 4.4: Broadcast packets (x.x.x.255) found in the Elasticsearch NetFlow logs using
Filebeat
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4.4

Examples and Use Cases

In this subsection, we provide multiple example translation processes related to some
network policies we listed in the introduction chapter and show how questions can be asked
and then translated to Elasticsearch Queries. As a starting point, we use an example to
illustrate the entire workflow of the system in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Workflow for Checking Policy Violation against Web Traffic
If network operators want to know the existence of “web traffic”, they can post
questions like “Is there any web traffic in our network?” Once NPCE receives the question,
the NLP module will analyze the question and output the corresponding resolved values
along with the identifiers these values belong to. In this case, “Is there any” belongs to the
answer identifier. “Web traffic” belongs to the special terms identifier under description.
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“Traffic” is the main object that the system needs to deal with and “in our network”
represents the device where the scope is ANY device in the network. Then the system will
ask the question to itself “What is in the Description?” Based on the detected information
which is “web traffic”, NPCE looks up the corresponding information about “web traffic”
in the alias file where all the low-level details are recorded. The “web traffic” uses TCP
as the transport layer protocol and port 80 as the destination address. The protocol and
port information will be used to generate the ELK query issued to the database. The
response from the database contains all the details such as the amount of traffic, and the
source/destination IP addresses, but not all of them are required by the user. In this case,
the user only wants to know “Is there any”. So NPCE constructs the answer based on the
amount of “web traffic” detected and returns to the user the expected answer containing the
amount. Based on the result, network operators can continue to examine why the policies
are not correctly enforced.
4.4.1

Insecure Application Protocol Policies

“Applications which transmit sensitive information over the network in clear
text, such as telnet and ftp, are prohibited and will be blocked. [2]”.
“The University Wireless Network should not be used inappropriately;
in particular you should not use the network to: run peer-to-peer (P2P) file
sharing software, e.g. BitTorrent. [3]”.
“For a computer system to be managed securely, functional unit technicians must: Disable or secure remote access from system-to-system (e.g.,
rlogin) [4]”.
These three policies are all about application layer protocols. All these protocols
have security weaknesses and hackers can take advantage of these vulnerabilities to get
information about the content transmitted.

As a result, these protocols should be

completely forbidden or restricted with exceptions. The question and extracted entities
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for the first policy are shown in Figure 4.6. The key component in the final ELK query is
shown in Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.6: Question and Extracted Entities for FTP and Telnet Traffic

Figure 4.7: Elasticsearch Query to Check FTP and Telnet Traffic
For this type of network policy, network administrators or policymakers can ask
similar questions below to check policy violations.
“Is there any ftp or telnet traffic in the network?”
In the question, only the protocol names are used to describe the traffic. Since there
is no timestamp or location mentioned. The system assumes that the user wants to check
on every device throughout the network traffic data stored in the database. When the
protocol names are detected, NPCE will look at the corresponding alias file and finds the
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low-level details related to the protocols. Here, in this case, are the transport layer protocol
and destination port number. Then NPCE utilizes these low-level details and generates the
Elasticsearch query. Once the response of the query is returned, NPCE counts the number
of the found traffic and generates the answer, and sends it back to the user.
4.4.2

Policies about Prohibited Services

Some network policies regulate the types of servers that are allowed on campus. Consider
the following two policies:
“Network usage judged appropriate by the University is permitted. Some
activities deemed inappropriate include, but are not limited to:

Attaching

unauthorized network devices, including but not limited to wireless routers,
gateways DHCP or DNS servers; or a computer set up to act like such a
device [5]”.
“Most network services through non-standard ports are not supported.
Services through non-standard ports may be restricted to a limited number
of subnets or hosts.

For example, WWW access via the standard HTTP

port will be permitted, but via some other arbitrary port number may not be
permitted [6].”
The translation process and final query for the first policy are shown in Figure 4.8
and Figure 4.9. The question contains “not” and correspondingly in the Elasticsearch
database, the match phrases are then placed in the “must not” field. The IP addresses
of the authorized server are provided in the alias file. A rogue server is an unauthorized
server. To know the existence of such servers, NPCE relies on the alias file to understand
which servers are considered the authorized ones. So if there is any similar network traffic
that does not come from these authorized servers, NPCE knows the existence of such rogue
servers.
For the second policy, users can ask:
“Is there any campus server that has incoming traffic on non-standard ports?”
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Figure 4.8: Questions and Extracted Entities for the Policy about Rogue Servers

Figure 4.9: Elasticsearch Query to Check the Existence of Rogue Servers
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“Campus server” will be recognized as the special term and NPCE will look up those
“non-standard ports” in the alias file and use them as the destination due to the fact that
the term “incoming” implies the direction.
4.4.3

Access Control Policies

“Campus printers should not be exposed to the public Internet. [7]”.
IP address ranges for the campus are provided in the alias file so that the system
will be able to find the IP addresses of the public Internet, which are expressed as addresses
other than the ones used for the campus address. The IP range in CIDR is processed
using regular expressions in the query. Then other fields are similar to the ones in previous
examples.

Figure 4.10: Question and Extracted Entities for the Policy about Campus Printer
The translation process and final result can be found in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11.
4.4.4

Port Scanning Policy

“Port scanning or security scanning is expressly prohibited unless prior
notification to Information Technology Security is made [8]”.
Similar to previous examples, users can ask questions like:
“Is there any port scanning traffic in the network?”
In this particular example, we need to understand the features port scanning traffic
has and then record the features in the alias file. A little bit different from previous examples,
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Figure 4.11: Elasticsearch Query for Campus Printer Access Policy
the match in this example is based on the statistics of network traffic, rather than a specific
field. To deal with the numbers and compare them, we utilize aggregation and bucket
selector to form the correct Elasticsearch query. If the users understand what port scanning
is, they can also include details in the question. For example,
“Is there any host in the network that sent packets to
more than 500 ports in the last minute?”
Such questions are based on how port scanning is defined. Users can add the details
as they want and NPCE will also be able to recognize these low-level details.
The translation process and final ELK query can be found in Figure 4.12 and
Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.12: Question and Extracted Entities for the Policy about Port Scanning

Figure 4.13: Elasticsearch Query Example for Port Scanning Traffic
4.4.5

IP source routing policy

“The following services or features must be disabled: All source routing and
switching [9]”.
IP source routing is a feature provided by the IP protocol. The sender of the network
packet can specify the specific path how they want the packet to be routed to the destination.
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In this example, we need to describe the features of the IP source routing packet.

Figure 4.14: Question and Extracted Entities for the policy regarding IP source routing

Figure 4.15: Elasticsearch Query for IP Source Routing Packets
The translation process and final query can be found in Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15.
The IP option field in the packet header of the IP source routing packets is recorded in the
alias file. There are two types of IP source routing, strict source routing (SSR) where the
IP option value is 137, and loose source routing (LSR) where the IP option value is 131.
The difference between the types is that strict source routing specifies the entire path that
a packet should traverse, while loose source routing only specifies an address on the path
that the packet should pass through.
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4.5

Discussion

We presented Network Policy Conversation Engine (NPCE), a chatbot for users to ask
natural language questions about policy violations. NPCE demonstrated its ability to
return to the users what they want to know about the network traffic statistics. However,
there is still room for improvement, especially in the following areas:
• The expressiveness of the mapping layer. Every NLP model requires certain
amounts of training examples to achieve the desired accuracy. In the mapping layer,
we only provided example identifiers and values that we used to train our model.
The model was able to deal with questions of certain types, but there is no assurance
that if the users change the way how they ask questions, NPCE would still correctly
extract the information and generate the query. Another step that can be done is to
find more network policies and investigate which terms are the most commonly used
ones. After the addition of these terms in the mapping layer, NPCE will be able to
react to more questions about network policy violations.
• The approach for collecting network traffic. To collect network traffic details
of different granularities, we used both NetFlow and TcpDump. This means that on
every interface of network switches/routers we need to run multiple programs to collect
and analyze network traffic. When the scale of the network is large, such programs
will certainly add burdens to the network traffic load. Algorithms are necessary to
determine where to run those applications so that network monitoring will introduce
minimum impact on the normal operations of the campus network.
4.6

Summary

In this chapter, we presented Network Policy Conversation Engine (NPCE), which is a
system that can be used by people to check network policy violations by asking natural
language questions. NPCE is able to extract useful information from the questions and
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translate them into database queries. The mapping layer not only provides guidelines
for what information should be extracted but also categorizes the identifiers to make the
translation to database queries straightforward and verifiable. We evaluated NPCE by
asking questions related to various network policies found on the websites of different
universities, and the results show that NPCE is able to understand these questions but
also can generate queries and get the answers from the database.
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Chapter 5:

Understanding the Internet Topology with IXP Data to Support
Future Internet Routing Policies

The Internet is made up of many Autonomous Systems (ASes). Based on their business
models, ASes often have multiple connection points to the rest of the Internet to provide
Internet services to their customers. The Internet routes network traffic based on the
destination addresses via the BGP protocol. Routing based on the source address, which
is mostly banned nowdays, is becoming a needed capability for the future Internet for
reliability, security, and performance. The capability to select how the traffic is routed
not only provides users with a better service experience but also enables ISPs to realize
economic benefits, i.e, by selling the unused bandwidth along different routes. As a first
step toward supporting future Internet routing policies, we focus on how the Internet is
connected and what the available routes are. In this chapter, we investigate the topic of
AS peering. We target third-party locations called Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) where
one AS sets up connections with others. We collected data of both IXPs and ASes to
implement an Internet topology graph to understand how ASes peer with each other. The
graph can be used to calculate available routes between two ASes and allows future network
policy writers to define routing policies describing which routes the users can choose and
the economic benefits that ISPs have by providing such routes.
5.1

Introduction

The Internet infrastructure is a large network that connects other “small” computer
networks all over the world. Organizations such as companies and universities manage their
own networks that are considered as Autonomous Systems (ASes). To centrally manage and
provide identities to each network that connects to the Internet, Internet Assigned Number
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Authority (IANA) appoints different Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) for assigning IP
addresses and AS numbers to these Autonomous Systems based on their location [108]. The
assigned IP address and AS numbers become the unique identifiers for these Autonomous
Systems to exchange traffic on the Internet.
The Autonomous System are operated by different Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
Based on the size, the ISPs can be divided into three tiers. The first tier, tier-one ISPs
are the largest service providers that have access to all other networks on the Internet.
According to DrPeering website [109], in the United States, tier-one ISPs include AT&T,
Verizon, Sprint, Century Link, Level 3, NTT, and Cogent. The tier-two ISPs are usually
the regional or the national providers. They purchase Internet access from tier-one ISPs or
peer with other tier-two providers to gain access to the Internet resources. Tier-three ISPs,
on the lowest layer of the hierarchy, are usually the providers that provide service to the
end-users. They purchase services from other providers so that their customers can have
access to the rest of the Internet.
As has been mentioned above, there are two types of main interconnection methods
that Autonomous Systems can select to exchange network traffic and gain access to Internet
resources:
• Through Transit Providers. Considered an “indirect” connection method, two
Autonomous Systems can connect with each other through a third Internet Service
Provider (ISP). For example, two tier-two ISPs can purchase Internet transit from
tier-one ISP so that the network traffic from the tier-two ISPs can reach each other
and also the rest of the Internet that the tier-one ISP has access to.
• Through Peering. An alternative approach for two Autonomous Systems to connect
is to peer. By setting up physical connections, two Autonomous Systems can exchange
network traffic in a “direct” manner. Compared with connecting through transit
providers, peering is considered more economic since Autonomous Systems do not
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need to pay transit fees. The cost of peering depends on how Autonomous Systems
agree to peer.
5.2

Peering on Internet

Peering provides an alternative way for the Autonomous Systems to connect with others
and the rest of the Internet. ISPs have their own business models that are used to fulfill
their goals based on the scale of the networks as well as their roles on the Internet. However,
even though peering has its advantages, it also has its drawbacks in satisfying the diverse
needs of Autonomous Systems. In this section, we discuss both the benefits and problems
brought by peering.
5.2.1

Peering Benefits

Based on tiers, Internet Service Providers may pick different ways to connect to the Internet
and provide services to their customers. We show the difference between transit connection
and peering in Figure 5.1. Starting from the bottom of the graph, tier-three ISPs, usually
the local or regional ISPs, provide Internet services to the end-customers. Since these ISPs
are comparatively small in size and do not have direct access to the rest of the Internet,
they have to purchase transit services from ISPs of a higher-tier. In the middle, tier-two
ISPs, are larger in the sizes of the networks. They sell transit services to the tier-three
ISPs and at the same time, they also purchase transit from tier-one ISPs. Consequently,
end-users connected to the tier-three ISPs will get access to the rest of the Internet using
this path.
However, one tier-two ISP can also choose to peer with another tier-two ISP with a
similar size at a third-party location such as an Internet Exchange Point. There are benefits
that peering has over purchasing transit services from ISPs of a higher-tier due to cost and
the direct control of network traffic.
• Cost. ISPs consider profits when they provide Internet services to their customers.
According to the Internet transit price published on DrPeering website [110], at the
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Figure 5.1: Internet Transit vs. Peering
end of the year 2015, the Internet transit prices had dropped to 0.63 US dollars per
Mbps, while the peering cost per month was 10000 US dollars. Using the data, it can
be calculated how much network traffic an ISP should carry to get a cheaper price on
the selection of peering or purchasing the transit services. Many papers [111, 112, 113,
114, 115] have compared and analyzed the difference between transit and peering, and
proposed economic models for peering. ISPs can benefit from these works to reduce
their cost and still provide high-quality network services to their customers.
• More control over the traffic. Each Autonomous System has the policies that
govern how the incoming network traffic is routed, typically based on the destination
address. This means that when an ISP purchases transit from a larger ISP, it has no
control over how the network traffic is routed. The ISPs who sell the transit service
will be solely responsible for routing the network traffic from their customers. With
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the existence of Internet Exchange Points, Autonomous Systems can peer with each
other which means that the route of the traffic can be optimized with more available
paths to choose from, thus cutting down the inefficient paths.
5.3

IXP Traffic Data

Autonomous Systems and Internet Exchange Points play an important role in the Internet
topology. The data provided by the IXPs can show the traffic that flows between peers.
The traffic volume is important since it may determine for each Autonomous System
whether peering at IXPs is economical compared with purchasing transit services from
other providers. We examined various IXP websites and tried to find information about
such network traffic exchanges between peers. At the same time, knowing how ASes are
connected is also important In this section, we introduce how we collected data about
Internet Exchange Points traffic and showed how the Autonomous Systems peer at these
IXPs. We generate an Internet topology graph composed of both ASes and IXPs and
examine the number of IXPs on the shortest paths between any pair of two ASes.
Much work related to IXP research has been proposed. From the perspectives of the
data used, there are two types of data that appeared in those works (1) Simulated data and
(2) Real-time IXP data. For example, in [116, 117] when the authors wanted to identify the
elephant flows in IXPs, they did not use the real IXP data. Instead, they created topologies
similar to real IXPs, such as AMS-IX [118] which is one of the world’s largest IXPs, and
used iperf [119] to send simulated traffic. For the second type of data, it is available on the
websites of individual IXPs. The data available on individual IXP websites is represented
by the time series graphs with the x-axis being the time series and the y-axis being the
throughput. These graphs are usually provided on HTML pages in the format of .png files
created by rrdtool [120]. There are numbers on the graphs in the format showing the current
data, the max data, and the average data. An example of the real-time traffic stats of the
Seattle IX [121] can be found in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Real-time Traffic Stats on Seattle IX Website
Such network traffic data can be important since the data can not only fit into models
to calculate the economic benefits of peering versus transit but also be used to check the
potential peering policy violations. Some of the peering policies have requirements for the
lowest bandwidth usage. However, there are some challenges getting the correct data from
the individual IXP websites.
• Graphs as the only available sources: Some IXP websites only provide visualized
graphs as the data source of the network traffic stats. To get the numbers out of these
graphs, an additional step is necessary. For example, the authors of [122] implemented
an OCR (optical character recognition) software to fetch numbers out of these traffic
stats graphs. Even though different OCR libraries are available, people may still need
to look at specific graphs due to the different formats of the graphs. The numbers may
appear following the names of different acronyms as the descriptions. For example in
Figure 5.2, the terms such as “cur in” and “cur out” need further processing to be
automatically understood as the “current inbound and outbound traffic”.
• Aggregated data rather than per-interface data: By looking at the individual
website of the IXPs ordered by peak traffic on the Packet Clearing House (PCH)
website [123], we found some IXPs in the USA that provide data in text format so
that they could be directly used, such as Seattle IX [121]. However, the data was
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aggregated data, representing all the network traffic sent/received by other peers.
Because peering policies focus on the traffic between the two involved Autonomous
Systems, traffic stats on each interface or port would be useful. The aggregated traffic
stats may not be useful for this type of peering policy. Some European IXPs such as
NIX [124] provides data on a specific interface which is helpful in analyzing the traffic
going to a specific AS.
5.4

Representing IXPs in the Internet Topology

In this section, we introduce how we figure out where the IXPs are within the context of
the Internet topology. We collected IXP and AS data from four data sources and created a
graphical representation that could be easily queried, processed, and visualized. The graph
was implemented in the graph database Neo4J, where different queries could be issued by
the users to get the information about IXPs and ASes.
5.4.1

The Obstacles to Understand Internet Peering Relationships

Research on the evolution of Internet topology has been carried out for a long time. The
key factors that prevent people from getting an accurate Internet topology graph include:
(1) the lack of specialized protocols
(2) inadequate data available
(3) the fast-changing Internet itself.
Different abstraction levels have been used to describe an Internet topology graph
such as the AS-level, the point of presence POP-level, the router-level, and the interfacelevel, the most popular among which is AS level. To draw an AS-level graph, the main
tools/techniques used include the BGP data, the traceroute data, and the Internet Routing
Registry (IRR) database as introduced in [125]. When it comes to the effect of IXPs on the
Internet topology, the authors of [126] provided detailed information about the most popular
data source corresponding to the above techniques and tools. Five data sources/projects in

107

total were mentioned including The Route Views project [127], CAIDA Ark/Skitter [128],
DIMES [129], IXP Mapping [130] and Packet Clearing House [123].
University of Oregon’s Route View project collects BGP information at IXPs. The
BGP table of the route server can be downloaded from the archive directory and we can
get human-readable data with tools such as bgpdump. The tables include useful information
such as the IP address of the peer, the AS number of the peer, target prefix, AS path, the
next-hop IP address, and so on. The AS links in the table are used for the AS relationship
inference for the entire Internet topology. One problem with the data is the accuracy.
When a link fails, the BGP convergence time determines how long it takes the connection
to recover. On the website of the Route Views Project, the routing information base (RIB)
files are dumped every two hours and are updated every 15 minutes.
CAIDA Ark/Skitter and DIMES are the two projects which made use of the tool
traceroute [131]. In the CAIDA Ark project, probing ICMP packets were sent to random
prefixes within a set of prefixes. The AS relationship data described whether two ASes are
peer-to-peer relationships or provider-to-customer relationships. In the DIMES project,
individual users all over the world participated in the traceroute measurement. These
projects tried to depict the AS-level Internet topology but did not put much emphasis on
IXPs.
The works described in [132, 133] focused on how to identify whether IXPs were
on the path between two ASes. An IXP can be considered as a network assigned with IP
prefixes. Different ASes participate in the IXP network by connecting to different interfaces
which also have IP prefixes. So when a traceroute is performed from one AS to another, if
the IP prefix of the IXP is available in the traceroute result, then we know that both the
ASes peer at the IXP. Additional information such as the IP prefixes of the ASes may also be
available in the traceroute result so it can be inferred whether two ASes (AS M and AS N)
peer at IXP by relating the IPs of the ASes to the AS numbers. However, this method also
has some drawbacks. First, we need to know the IP prefix of the IXP. Even though sources
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such as Packet Clearing House [123] and PeeringDB [134] provide information about IP
addresses of the IXPs they have on file, the information is not completely consistent based
on the number of IXPs. Second, when a traceroute is performed, it is often the case that
some routers on the path may be unable to show their identities (not respond or respond with
an alternative address) and the consequence is that we see a “*” symbol in the traceroute
result or get wrong inferring results mapping using the alternative address. So the source
and destination ASes of the traceroute have to be carefully planned and selected. In [130],
the authors used data from multiple data sources and carefully selected the source/target
looking glass servers to ensure the reliability of the results. Sample looking glass servers
can be found in [131] where traceroute can be performed.
The authors of the paper [135] proposed a model which was quite different from the
previous works. It set the IXPs as the center of the model and argued that the internet can
be modeled as a bipartite graph where IXPs represent one set of nodes and ASes represent
the other. The key assumption based on a bipartite graph was that no node within the same
set was adjacent which meant there was no link between any two ASes or IXPs. This was
not true on the AS level since two ASes could have private links. While the fact was that
using their model, the data selection becomes quite clear and simple. There was no need to
consider the BGP tables anymore and only the datasets from Packet Clearing House [123]
and PeeringDB [134] were enough where the merged lists of IXPs and AS members of each
IXP were used to construct the bipartite graph. This ensured the accuracy of the result
since the process was simple and straightforward. After the data was processed, attributes
were assigned to different nodes. For example, IXP nodes would have the location attribute
and AS nodes were classified into whether they are content delivery networks (CDN), ISPs,
or organizations. Then it can be analyzed for an IXP which type of ASes had the highest
number of connections to it. It also explored how many IXPs were there on the shortest
path between two ASes. This paper showed from a different perspective where the positions
of IXPs were in the entire Internet topology.
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5.4.2

Dataset and Approach

To build an Internet topology graph that connects both the IXPs and ASes, we first used
an approach similar to that described in [135], which was to generate a basic bipartite
graph composed of the IXPs as a separate set of nodes and ASes as another set of nodes.
The assumption was that in a bipartite graph, no two nodes in the same set could be
adjacent. The two basic data sources we used were PeeringDB [134] and Packet Clearing
House [123]. To show the potential links between ASes and enrich the types of connections
and information about nodes, we added data from another two data sources, namely the
AS classification data and AS relationship data from the CAIDA website [136].
• PeeringDB Data: We used the three REST APIs to collect and process the
data from PeeringDB, namely the /api/list ix/, /api/retrieve ixlan/ and /api/retrieve netixlan/. The first API was used to get the list of IXPs associated with the
PeeringDB IDs. Once we had the IDs, we used them as the parameters in the other
two APIs to get the result about the connections of IXPs and their members. We
show below an example of the final data after processing. It means AS number 20940
is connected to the SIX Seattle Internet Exchange (PeeringDB ID=13) at IP address
206.81.80.113. The SIX Seattle Internet Exchange is located in Seattle, the US, and
the connection link has an MTU of 1500 and a capacity of 100000M with an open
peering policy.
“20940, 206.81.80.113, SIX Seattle: MTU 1500, US, Seattle, 13, 100000, Open”
• Packet Clearing House Data: PeeringDB has rich information about the IXPs
and the connected ASes. However, simply inspecting data from one data source does
not ensure the accuracy and correctness of the data. We also collected data from
Packet Clearing House, but mainly used the data as a filter. Basically, to eliminate
the inconsistency between the PeeringDB data and the Packet Clearing House data,
we examined the IXPs which were listed as “active” to see whether they also existed
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in the PeeringDB data. If both data sources contain the IXP, we checked whether
the subnets and IP prefixes for them were the same. As a result, we only kept the
data that appeared consistently in both PeeringDB and Packet Clearing House.
• CAIDA AS Data: To enrich the information of the ASes, we also collected data
from the CAIDA [136] website. For the CAIDA AS Type data, an example is shown
in Figure 5.3. The data clearly shows the AS number, how the data source type is
inferred, and the inferred type. The inferred type of an Autonomous System can
be content provider, enterprise, and transit/access provider. We also collected the
CAIDA AS Relationship data. The data format is shown in Figure 5.4 and two ASes
can have two types of relationships, namely peers (0) or customer-provider (-1). The
first example means AS 1 and AS 3549 are peering ASes, concluded from the BGP
data. The second example means AS 2 is the provider of AS 6147, also concluded
from the BGP data.

Figure 5.3: CAIDA AS Type Example

Figure 5.4: CAIDA AS Relationship Example
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Graph

Elements

Attributes
Name

AS
Nodes

InferredType
Name
City
Country
IP

IXP

Edges

AS-[r:connectsto]->IXP
Policy
Speed
AS-[r:hasInferredRelationship]->AS

Examples
AS Numbers
Transit/Access
Content
Enterprise
IXP Names
Some City
Some Country
IXP Interface IP
Open
Selective
Restrictive
Link Speed
Peer-to-peer BGP/MLP

Type

Source
PDB+PCH
CAIDA AS Type
PDB+PCH
PDB+PCH
PDB+PCH
PDB+PCH
PDB
PDB
CAIDA AS Relationship

Provider-to-Customer BGP

Table 5.1: Elements in the Internet Topology Graph
A graph is made up of nodes and edges. In the Internet topology graph that we
tried to visualize, we have ASes and IXPs as nodes and the connection between them as
the edges. We included additional information from the data source and load them into the
graph database Neo4J [137] using the Python library py2neo [138]. The summary of the
graph can be found in Table 5.1.
The names of the ASes are the AS numbers and the InferredType shows whether the
AS is a transit provider, a content provider, or an enterprise. IXPs have the attributes of
names and where they are located in the format of city and country pair. IXPs and ASes are
the nodes in the graph. For the edges, there are two types representing whether ASes and
IXPs are connected, and the potential relationships between ASes. The links between ASes
and IXPs show the information such as the peering type (open, selective, or restrictive) of
the corresponding IXP, the IP address of the IXP interface connected, and the speed of
the link. The links between the ASes show the inferred relationship whether they are peers
or provider-customer. Finally, we produced a graph consisting of 9939 nodes (640 IXPs,
9299 ASes) and 229804 edges (24851 AS-IXP links and 204953 inferred-relationship links
between ASes).
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5.4.3

Prototype Internet Topology Graph and Example Queries

Once we have the Internet topology graph in the graph database, various tools can be used
to query the statistic results about the nodes and edges. The Neo4j [137] database provides
convenient ways to query the data using the Cypher Query Language. The graphical user
interface of the Neo4j Desktop is user-friendly for the users to visualize and query the graph.
Here we provide some examples showing how to get the information about IXPs and ASes
using the Cypher Query Language in Neo4j Desktop.
• The locations of IXPs: IXPs spread all over the world. To get information about
which cities host a large number of IXPs, users can issue the query as shown in
Figure 5.5. The query returns the top ten cities that host the highest number of IXPs
in the world. As the results show, Jakarta in Indonesia, Bangkok in Thailand host the
highest numbers of IXPs (7), and New York, Frankfort, Tokyo, and Dallas host the
same number of IXPs (6). Using the result, researchers can propose location-based
economic models for IXPs.
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Figure 5.5: Cypher Query Showing the Top Ten Cities Hosting highest numbers of IXPs
• The scales of IXPs: Users may wonder which IXPs are the largest IXPs in the
world. The scale of an IXP can be measured by the number of ASes that peer at the
IXP. In the graph, it can be measured using the number of incoming links to the IXP.
Users can issue the query as shown in Figure 5.6 to get the largest IXPs and then go
to individual IXP websites to get the network traffic data for further analysis.
• ASes ranked by the number of peers: Autonomous Systems can choose to peer
with other ASes at IXPs. In the Internet topology graph we created, ASes are only
represented by their AS numbers and the inferred type. However, these attributes do
not reflect who these ASes are and how these ASes connect with each other. Users
may wonder which ASes have the largest number of peers. Users can issue similar
queries as shown in Figure 5.7 to fetch the peering information of an AS.
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Figure 5.6: Cypher Query Showing the Top Five IXPs with Most Peering Members

Figure 5.7: Cypher Query Showing the Top Five ASes with Most Peering ASes
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If the users are interested in what these ASes shown in the table are, they can further
find the information of the AS online. For example, AS 6939 is the AS number for
Hurricane Electric, which is one of the largest Internet Backbone and Colocation
Provider [139].
• Who are peering at an IXP: Simply looking at the members of an IXP does not
answer the question of whether all of them peer with each other. The Neo4j database
provides an easy way for people to know the pairs of ASes that peer at an IXP. In
Figure 5.8, we show a snippet of the Internet topology graph we have created. The
query returns all the IXPs located in the city of Chicago. Only five nodes marked in red
are returned meaning there are five IXPs located in Chicago. We use Coresite-Any2Chicago IXP as an example by clicking the “expand” button of the node and then
the graph shows the members of the selected IXP. The purple edges indicate which
Autonomous Systems are the members of the IXP, using a “connectsto” relation.
The green edges show the inferred relationship between ASes using the CAIDA AS
Relationship dataset. If two ASes are both the members of an IXP and at the same
time, they have an inferred relationship of “peer-to-peer”, then we consider both the
ASes peer at this IXP.
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Figure 5.8: Snippet of IXPs in Chicago and Members of the Coresite-Any2-IXP
• Multiple paths with different capacities between two ASes: In the produced
graph, users can find out all the available paths between any pair of ASes. These
available routes enable the possibility for ASes to provide flexible routing options
and write the corresponding network routing policies. In Figure 5.9, we show the
snippet of a query that calculates an AS that has multiple paths (with different link
capacity) to AS 24482. The corresponding graph is shown in Figure 5.10. AS 24482
and AS 327814 have an inferred relationship of peering members. The two ASes peer
at several IXPs which means that multiple paths are available for the network traffic
to flow between the two ASes. In such a graph, the capacity of each link between
the AS and the IXP will influence the available maximum bandwidth of the entire
path. For example, if the capacity of the link between AS 24482 and IXP LINX
LON1:Main is 10000mbps while the capacity of the link between AS 327814 and IXP
LINX LON1:Main is only 1000mbps, the available capacity for the entire path (AS
24482 to IXP LINX LON1:Main to AS 327814) will be 1000mbps which is the smaller
value of the two links. By calculating the capacity of the entire path, we can see that
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for different paths the capacities are different as well. In the table result shown in
Figure 5.9, if the traffic from AS 24482 to AS 327814 goes through the two LINX
IXPs, the capacities for both routes are 1000mbps while if the traffic goes through the
other two IXPs, e.g, France-IX Paris or BCIX: the capacities become 100mbps.

Figure 5.9: Capacities for Multiple Paths between AS 24482 and AS 327814

Figure 5.10: Multiple Paths between AS 24482 and AS 327814
The above examples provide guidance on how to fetch IXP and AS related
information from the Internet topology graph. The graph database can be further used
to calculate the paths between ASes. For example, if the users are interested in “how many
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IXPs are there on the shortest path between any pair of ASes?”, they can use not only the
Cypher Queries but also other graph libraries such as NetworkX [140] for the calculation.
The graph can be also used as an SDN application for the automatic management of peering
policies at IXPs.
5.5

Summary

In this chapter, we made the first step toward supporting future Internet routing policies.
To understand what routes are available to enable routing based on the source addresses,
we investigated IXPs and Internet peering. We collected data from various data sources
and created an Internet topology graph in the graph database Neo4j. The graph shows
the business relationships between ASes and the IXPs where ASes peer with each other.
By issuing different Cypher Queries in the database, users can understand the Internet
topology on different granularities. Different routes can be calculated to support future
Internet routing policies based on source addresses.
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Chapter 6:

Managing Network Policies in a Hybrid SDN/Legacy Network

The emergence of Software-Defined Networks (SDN) provides users with the ability to
control and monitor the network in a fine-grained way. Network services can be deployed
using various SDN applications. One of the key differences between SDN and the traditional
network is the separation of the control plane and the data plane. Due to the different ways
in which SDN networks and traditional networks are managed, network administrators
need to spend more effort managing a network that is composed of both the SDN-capable
devices and legacy devices (switches and routers), which we refer to as a hybrid SDN/Legacy
network.
Enterprises and universities are deploying SDN networks. However, there are a few
reasons that make organizations reluctant to upgrade/replace their existing network into
a whole SDN-capable network all at once. It is often cost-prohibitive to apply changes on
a large scale since the cost includes not only the expenses to purchase new devices, but
also the expenses to train the employees on how to use a different type of network. A
compromise solution is to deploy SDN incrementally in the network. The challenge is how
to provide the SDN services network-wide rather than only a small portion of the network
that is composed of SDN-capable devices.
In this chapter, we describe the challenge from two aspects. First, SDN-based
services provide programmatic control over the network, which at the same time leads to the
questions such as “whether university network administrations should let the researchers
use such services on demand?” and “how much permission should be given to such network
services that change the route of the traffic?” Second is the question of how such SDN-based
services can be extended throughout the legacy part of the network? For the first problem,
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we argue that with the cooperation of the campus IT and researcher, proper permission
can be delegated to researchers running such network services. These SDN-based services
can be designed to cause no harm to the normal campus network services. For the second
problem, we use Policy-Based Routing (PBR) [141] and a graph database to extend our
VIP Lanes [1] service, which is SDN-based, to the legacy part of our campus network. Our
simulation results in a campus-like topology testbed show that we can provide customers
with the VIP Lanes services even though the end-hosts do not have a direct connection to
the SDN switches.
6.1

Operational Concerns

The emergence of SDN has enabled both simplified and centralized control of the network.
However, to deploy SDN, traditional switches and routers should be replaced and upgraded
to those that have SDN-capabilities. There are two main concerns (1) Should the network be
upgraded to fully SDN-capable all at once? (2) What is the consequence of SDN deployment
and whether networks will become more difficult to manage? To answer the above questions,
we analyze SDN deployment and network management in a hybrid SDN/legacy network.
6.1.1

SDN Deployment and Solution

Despite the advantages SDN has, problems occur when we actually deploy SDN in enterprise
or campus networks. One important topic is how to coordinate SDN with the existing
traditional network, which is composed of many legacy network switches and routers.
Campus IT groups generally have constrained budgets that limit their ability to deploy
SDN [83]. The costs include not only hardware but also “hidden” costs such as the need to
train network operators to manage an SDN network. Another factor is the time required
for the enterprises to reap the benefits after deploying SDN. Return on Investment (ROI)
is what every enterprise cares about. For example, B4 [142], a software-defined WAN that
connects Google’s data centers actually took years to be deployed; such a long payback
period is unaffordable for most enterprises.
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Incremental deployment of SDN on the campus networks results in a hybrid network,
which is composed of both legacy network devices and SDN-capable devices.

There

are several advantages of a hybrid network. First, from the perspective of budget, the
deployment of a hybrid network eases this concern since legacy network devices are replaced
and upgraded to SDN-capable devices gradually. Second, upgrading to a SDN-capable
network is based on the need of the organizations. If the find-grained control is only required
on a small part of the network, there is no need to upgrade all the network devices [143].
A hybrid network is quite suitable in this scenario since it can receive the benefits of SDN
without fully deploying it.
6.1.2

Shared Control and Trust in a Hybrid Network

Within the environment of a hybrid network, legacy devices, and SDN-capable devices
coexist. For network management, these devices should be treated differently. The SDN
controller has a bird’s-eye view of the entire network topology, which only includes the
SDN-capable devices, such as OpenFlow-enabled switches. In other words, we manage the
SDN-capable devices by programming the SDN controller, while for the legacy devices we
use other mechanisms as network administrators do today.
SDN provides opportunities for researchers to write their customized applications.
These applications can be used to either change the forwarding tables of the switches and
routers or get the network stats information, which means that these SDN applications
may have control of the entire network if full permission is given to the researchers and
their SDN applications. Network administrators have the responsibility to ensure that the
networks are running smoothly and reliably. It is also the case that network administrators
are responsible for policy exceptions. Some network policy documents say that exceptions
to route/send certain types of network traffic require getting approval from the campus
administrations.

However, these approvals typically take time to be processed, which

is contradictory to one of the advantages brought by SDN, which is the ability to be
set up/configured dynamically in real-time. It has been a challenge to persuade campus
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administrations to allow researchers to create and deploy customized network services using
SDN in the campus production network, in part because they want time to analyze and
approve custom configurations and any exceptions to the rules. One thing to note is
that the default programs/applications that come along with the SDN controllers from
different vendors only have limited basic capabilities. The applications written by the
researchers which aim at changing the way network traffic is routed are the ones that
campus administrations may have concerns about.
6.1.2.1

Principles of Cooperation

To address the issues mentioned above and to build mutual trust between the researchers
and campus administrations, we develop a cooperative model that assures the campus
administrations that giving certain permissions to network researchers to create customized
flows on demand will cause no harm to the normal operations of the campus network.
A first step toward cooperation is to establish that campus IT will only approve
certain network traffic types that can be directly controlled by the researchers.
The campus network traffic will continue to be controlled by IT following the
policies and existing procedures. Only the network traffic approved by the IT can
be controlled by researchers and their SDN applications.
We consider the type of network traffic that will be approved by the campus IT to
be an “exception” group of traffic since compared with other types of network traffic that
may appear on campus, the “exception” group is not required to be handled by default
network rules, but rather can be programmed/controlled by users. Most of the traffic is
still operated by the network administrators in the same way as it is managed. There is no
change in general and the “exception” group is taken out for careful review.
The match and action pair in an OpenFlow rule can be used to implement such
a principle. That is, a rule that matches all types of traffic using the symbol “*” will be
forwarded using the default path with the lowest priority (0). All the other types of network
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traffic approved by IT will appear as flows with higher priorities, which will override the
default rule if the match happens. As a result, if the traffic does not match any flow
approved by the IT, it will be processed using the default rule, which works in exactly the
same way as how non-SDN switches process it.
However, it is not simple to implement the principle because (1) SDN switches,
typically OpenFlow-based, may not support such a default rule that matches “ALL” the
network traffic and output it to a specific port. (2) The default rule has the lowest priority
and matches “ALL” the network traffic, implying that all traffic handled by the switch must
be handled by the (potentially limited) bandwidth of the OpenFlow processing mechanism.
Considering the fact that the amount of such “normal” traffic is huge since it consists of the
majority of network traffic on campus, such a match may potentially incur a performance
penalty on the “normal” traffic. The majority of the network traffic managed by IT should
be treated in the same way as it is managed daily. As a result, it is important to identify
which OpenFlow switches support this kind of “normal” rule at a fast speed.
A second step toward cooperation involves stating how we deal with the special
groups of flows approved by IT.
IT approved flows will appear as SDN rules with higher priorities so that the
matched packets will be processed according to these rules instead of the “normal”
rule. So the approved flows will not influence other regular flows.
Network administrators still manage the switches like they usually do. The SDN packets
are processed separately from the majority of network traffic using flows with different
priorities. In other words, the network administrators do not need to keep in touch with
SDN researchers and reply to their requests on demand. The approval will be made in
advance and the researchers set up SDN rules that are allowed to be set up.
The third step toward cooperation regulates the format of the approved flows.
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The match fields in SDN processing rules are limited to the format of the 5tuple, (source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port, transport layer
protocol).
In the project, we cooperated with the campus IT and got approval for certain types
of network traffic that can be controlled by the SDN applications. Campus IT could delegate
a portion of flow space to departmental IT staff and students. The ability to give out specific
portions of the flow space, in the granularity of flows, allows campus IT to be assured that
only limited types of network traffic will get approval to be controlled by the researchers
and their SDN applications, which will not influence the normal operation of the campus
network.
There are several actions that are allowed in the OpenFlow specification. To assure
the campus IT that our control software will not cause harm to the network, we describe
the fourth principle:
Our control software only applies limited actions on the matching flows, and
these actions are pre-approved by IT.
For example, in the VIP Lanes project, most of the flows are redirected using the action
“output to port” allowed by IT. Only the VLAN and the destination MAC address may
have to be rewritten.
6.1.2.2

Including Non-SDN Switches as a Part of SDN

Due to the different mechanisms used by SDN and traditional networks, one of the challenges
of such a hybrid network is how to take control of the entire network, using the capabilities
provided by the SDN controller. We proposed an approach, where the SDN controller can
also have certain control of the legacy network switches. As a result, the SDN controller is
able to manage the entire network in a unified manner, which makes it possible to create
SDN services that are available to the network users even if they are not directly connected
to the SDN-capable switches.
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The SDN controller has a bird’s-eye view of the SDN portion of the network,
composed of SDN-capable switches. The control is based on the protocols such as OpenFlow.
However, legacy routers may not support such protocols. Their basic capabilities are to
drop and redirect packets, which are only the functionalities in the data plane. SDN has
separated the control plane and the data plane, making the control more flexible through
different applications. This is not applicable on legacy routers due to the lack of support
for protocols like OpenFlow.
Many legacy switches support policy-based routing, which makes it possible for
network administrators to define policies that override the default routes computed by the
routing protocols such as OSPF. At the same time, most legacy switches support Access
Control Lists (ACLs), where special access groups are created matching specific types of
packets. The ACLs are used to drop certain packets when the packets are found based
on the match. We can leverage these functionalities provided by the legacy devices to
make automatic control over legacy devices through SDN controllers possible. Basically,
the communication between the SDN controller and the legacy switches can be achieved in
two aspects. First, we can use SNMP to discover the topology by detecting how the legacy
switches are connected with the SDN-capable devices. Next, we can write SDN applications
that can ssh into the command line interface (CLI) of legacy switches to implement policybased routing on-demand. Thus the automatic control of the entire network is achieved.
SDN network services are available to users of the network regardless of their locations.
6.2

Extending VIP Lanes to Legacy Networks

Nowdays the need for big data transfer is increasing. However, campus networks have
different middleboxes such as IDS, NAT, and Firewall that may be considered obstacles
to the big data transfer since at the same time these middleboxes provide services, they
also require packets to be strictly checked, causing performance to decrease. To address
the needs, we introduce VIP Lanes [1], an SDN service provided to researchers that can
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route the data in a path that bypasses these middleboxes. Only trusted users can create
pre-approved flows on demand when they transfer the data. However, what if a user is
connected to a legacy switch rather than an SDN switch? How can we make the service
available to them as well?
6.2.1

VIP Lanes, A Motivated SDN Service for High-Speed Flows

To enable such network services on the production network on campus, both hardware
deployment and software control are necessary. We first introduce how VIP Lanes was
deployed on campus. Then we discuss the architecture of control software that actually
control the SDN-capable devices.
Traditional campus networks consist of a set of campus core routers that connect the
edge with the router/switch of buildings (A, B, C, D, and E.) as shown in Figure 6.1. For
the users who are connected to the traditional campus networks, the performance of the
big data transfer may be degraded since all the packets have to go through the middleboxes
such as IDS systems and Firewalls no matter which building they are in. These middleboxes
lie on the only path where users can get resources from the Internet.
We have seen SDN networks are gradually deployed on the campus network. We
cannot use the SDN networks to replace the campus core network, but they are running
parallel to the original core networks as shown in Figure 6.2. The structure can provide
high-speed paths for researchers to perform big data transfer experiments only when they
are connected to SDN-capable switches. If they are located in building A or building E, the
path for the big data transfers still goes through the campus core switch with middleboxes
on it.
In order to extend the service to the legacy routers and switches, we connect the
legacy ones with the SDN core as shown in Figure 6.3. The dotted lines are the new links
that connect legacy switches to the SDN-portion of the network. By writing customized
SDN applications, traffic can be redirected to the SDN portion of the network and thus gets
the benefits of a high-speed flow path.
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Figure 6.1: Traditional Campus Network
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Figure 6.2: Campus Network with SDN Deployed
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Figure 6.3: Extend the SDN Functionality to Legacy Routers/Switches
6.2.2

VIP Lanes Software

The system architecture of VIP Lanes is shown in Figure 6.4.

Figure 6.4: VIP Lanes Control Software
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The major components of the VIP Lanes system include a front-end VIP Lanes
server, the path service library, the graph database, the Policy Based Routing (PBR)
module, and the VIP Lanes modules in the format of SDN applications. To use VIP
Lanes, big data researchers (1) use the front-end VIP Lanes server for a flow request. After
the authentication for credentials, he/she inputs the 5-tuple (source IP address, destination
IP address, protocol, destination port) along with the timeout on the user-friendly GUI. (2)
The delegation tree regulates what IP address ranges can be used by each group of users.
The VIP Lanes server authenticates the source IP address based on the group. It will return
the message on the GUI if users used source IP addresses that they are not allowed to use (3)
Once the authentication is finished, the VIP Lanes server wraps up and sends the requests
from the GUI to the back-end systems. The path service library communicates with the
graph database to fetch the information of the entire topology. Then it puts together the
requests from the VIP Lanes server and the topology information to calculate a path that
bypasses the middleboxes. This path may include those legacy switches that connect the
researcher to the campus network. (4) The path service library calls the module on the
controller using the REST API to insert SDN rules on all the SDN switches on the path,
and the PBR module to install policy-based routing policies on legacy routers. For each
calculated path, two VIP Lanes are created for both the forward traffic and reverse traffic.
The user can also specify the timeout of the SDN rules based on how much data he/she is
going to transfer. The policies installed on legacy routers have to be removed explicitly by
the PBR module when they are no longer needed.
We extend the existing VIP Lanes system to a hybrid network environment. To
help the SDN controller gain the view of the entire network topology including the legacy
switches and connected hosts, we made use of static JSON-encoded files as well as the
graph database, Neo4j. A graph is composed of vertices and edges. In a network graph,
network devices (e.g., switches and routers) and hosts are considered vertices while the
links among them are the edges. The path service library first loads the topology from the
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controller and creates a base graph in Neo4j. Then it takes advantage of the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) [144] along with Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) [145] to
search the information of the legacy layer-3 switches based on the IP address provided in the
static files (alias files). It also queries the ARP table [146] of the legacy switches to find the
information of the potential hosts. After all the required information of the legacy network
is collected, (including the information of the legacy L3 switches, the hosts connected to the
L3 switches, and the links), a new graph is created based on this information and is added
to the Neo4j graph database as a complement to the base graph. So the graph in Neo4j
represents a complete hybrid network. The path service library on the SDN controller then
has a bird’s-eye view of the entire hybrid network, including all the potential hosts that may
use the VIP Lanes system. With the view of the entire topology, the path service library
is able to compute a hybrid SDN path for the hosts that are connected to a legacy switch.
To redirect traffic from a legacy network to SDN network, we make use of bash script that
implements Policy Based Routing (PBR) and apply it on the legacy L3 switches.
6.2.3

Policy-Based Routing

Policy-Based Routing [141], as its name indicates, can route network traffic based on the
policy defined. Access Control List (ACL) and route-map are the two components of the
PBR. Route-map matches the traffic based on the groups defined in the access control list.
Then it defines the action, for example, setting the next-hop address. Once a PBR policy
is created, it needs to be applied to the specific interface of a switch. Then the packets
arriving on the interface will be routed following the policy. Considering the fact that users
of the VIP Lanes system specify both the source IP address and the destination IP address
when they request to create flows on the server, we then decide to use the extended ACL
(which allows the match beyond the source IP address as in the standard ACL) so that the
settings on the legacy devices have the same fields to match the traffic.
Figure 6.5 shows a sample configuration of PBR and the application on an interface.
The access control list permits the TCP traffic from source IP address 172.23.7.194 to
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destination IP address 172.23.7.178. The route map defines an action for this class of
traffic, which is “sending the matching traffic to the next-hop address of 10.1.5.1”. Once
the route map is set up, it is applied to a specific interface (VLAN16 in this example) acting
as an IP routing policy. As a result, when the traffic with source IP address 172.23.7.194
and destination IP address 172.23.7.178 arrives on interface VLAN16, it will be routed to
the next-hop address 10.1.5.1, as directed by the PBR policy.

Figure 6.5: An Example Configuration for Policy Based Routing
6.3

Experiment Setup and Results

To examine whether the PBR module works to introduce the VIP Lanes services to
the legacy part of the network, we performed two types of experiments to measure the
throughput with the VIP Lanes service on and compare it with the throughput when traffic
is routed under a normal path on campus. In the first experiment, we used the iperf [119]
tool to send test traffic between two machines on campus (i.e., east-west flows). Then, in
the second experiment, we analyzed the behavior of flows from machines on the campus
network to various Internet2 sites (i.e., south-north flows) using the perfSONAR [147] tool.
6.3.1

East-West Flow Experiment

For this experiment, we set up a laboratory testbed as shown in Figure 6.6. The SDN
portion of the testbed is composed of Aruba 3800 series switches with OpenFlow enabled,
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running in hybrid mode. The legacy network has a Cisco L3 switch, or more specifically,
Cisco 3750 running Cisco IOS version 12.2(55)SE7, to which the host named cisco-host is
connected.

Figure 6.6: Campus-like hybrid topology prototype
We first measured the throughput for flows between la2-pc1 and la3-pc1, which were
connected directly to the SDN network.
We used iperf to send TCP traffic between these two machines and compared the
results between the default route (going through the Core switch) and SDN route by turning
VIP Lanes on/off. The result was plotted in Figure 6.7 and shows that the performance
over the default route between these two hosts under default conditions was severely limited
by the bottleneck links (dashed lines in Figure 6.6) connected to the Core switch (data
fluctuating around 10 Mbps). When VIP Lanes was turned on, the result increased to
around 510 Mbps.
Similarly, to check the communication between the machines in the legacy portion
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and the SDN portion, we performed another experiment to measure the throughput between
the Cisco-host and la3-pc1 in the figure. In this case, the key difference was that one of
the endpoints (the cisco-host) was attached to the legacy portion of the testbed. As the
result in Figure 6.8 shows, the default throughput was around 10 Mbps while the VIP Lanes
throughput got closer to the result we obtained in our previous experiment, showing that
VIP Lanes which involves setting up PBR entries to reroute flows from the Cisco L3 switch
to the SDN network did not influence the transfer performance and the traffic was correctly
routed into the SDN network using the PBR policy we set up.

Figure 6.7: Iperf result between la2-pc1 and la3-pc1 (log scale)

Figure 6.8: Iperf result between Cisco-host and la3-pc1 (log scale)
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6.3.2

North-South flow experiment

The VIP Lanes system has been deployed on the campus production network for the
researchers to bypass the bottlenecks and thus make big data transfer to/from cloud
storage faster. In this experiment, we designed test cases and measured on the real campus
production network to see whether shared trust and control can be realized on the hybrid
campus network. In other words, we examined whether hosts connected to the legacy
portion of the campus network can take advantage of the VIP Lanes service as the SDN
users do.

Figure 6.9: Sample part of campus network topology
Figure 6.9 shows the difference between how SDN traffic and normal traffic get out
of campus and reach the Internet. If we do not use VIP Lanes, when the traffic arrives on
SW2, it will be directed to SW6 and then forwarded to the normal campus network, going
through the middleboxes that limit the performance, the campus edge router, and finally
delivered out to the Internet. We notice that the middleboxes on this normal path will
reduce the big data transfer performance. If the VIP Lanes system is used, the traffic will
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go directly from SW3, SW4 to the campus edge router. As a result, the path it traverses
bypasses the middleboxes. Similar to our previous experiment, we applied PBR on the
Cisco-L3 switch to redirect flows towards the SDN core (SW4).
The reason for applying Policy Based Routing on the Cisco-L3 switch was to make
sure that the traffic matching on the policy, such as the trusted flows, would be redirected
to follow a path that contains at least one SDN-capable switch.
To fulfill the goal, we took advantage of SW5, which was a switch connected to the
SDN-capable switch SW3. The path from Cisco-L3 to SW5 was configured as a trunk for
the same VLAN so that the interface on SW5 (marked red) could be used as the next-hop
IP address in Policy-Based Routing. This was the configuration we used without modifying
the existing topology. By default, the traffic would go through the normal campus network.
After applying PBR, the traffic was redirected to SW5 where the SDN-capable switch SW3
was on the path. When the traffic arrived on SW3, it followed the SDN rules installed and
was redirected to SW4. So the path control has been realized by means of Policy-Based
Routing and SDN rules.
In the experiment, we measured the throughput from a host machine at the
University of Kentucky (UK) campus network to four remote sites at Internet2. The selected
sites include chic-pt1.es.net (Chicago), atla-pt1.es.net (Atlanta), hous-pt1.es.net
(Houston) and ga-pt1.es.net (San Diego). The tool we used for the tests was perfSONAR,
which actually runs iperf3 for the measurement. For each site, we compared the throughput
for traffic that goes through both the UK campus core network and the SDN network
that bypasses the middleboxes. Both end systems were equipped with a 10Gbps network
interface card (NIC). For both the normal path going through the UK campus network and
the middlebox-free SDN path, we ran 10 tests to each of the four remote sites, the duration
per test was 30 seconds.
In Table 6.1, the average performance for the traffic going through the SDN
middlebox-free path provided by VIP Lanes was much better than that of the traffic going
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Table 6.1: Throughput comparison to different sites using Normal and SDN paths
Sites
Normal (Gbps) SDN (Gbps)
Mean
SD
Mean SD Speedup
San Diego, CA 1.28
0.26
7.97 0.01
6.2x
Houston, TX
1.90
0.29
8.78 0.46
4.6x
Atlanta, GA
1.97
0.28
8.74 0.31
4.4x
Chicago, IL
2.59
0.36
9.52 0.30
3.6x
to the campus core network. The best average performance we got was for the flow sent
to the Chicago site being 9.52Gbps. This number is very close to the maximum speed
supported by the network interface card. The San Diego site was the one to which we got
the lowest performance for both the SDN network and the normal campus network. Even
though it was expected, because San Diego is away from the UK campus, this site yields
the highest speedup factor across the four sites. For the standard deviation, the results for
the SDN path and the normal path did not vary significantly, remaining to be consistent
with the measurements we presented in our initial prototype.
6.4

Summary

In this chapter, we discussed network policy management in the context of a hybrid
SDN/legacy network. We started from the perspectives of campus administrations and
analyzed why in general they were reluctant to delegate permissions for researchers to
control the network.

We proposed a cooperative model that can assure the network

administrators that letting the researchers manage and control certain IT-approved types
of flows will do no harm to the normal operations of the campus network due to the fact
that both the type of network traffic and the actions are limited and pre-approved by the
IT. Then we investigated whether we could enable SDN services network-wide by writing a
customized SDN application that will control the setup of Policy-Based Routing on legacy
switches/routers. The two types of experiments, campus-campus, and campus-Internet
both showed that hosts connected to the legacy switch can still use the VIP Lanes services
with the help of the PBR module. The paths created by the VIP Lanes control software
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enable a faster transfer speed compared with the paths to the campus core, which passes
through the middleboxes.
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Chapter 7:

7.1

Summary and Future Work

Dissertation Summary

In this dissertation, we proposed novel approaches to simplify network policy management
using NLP and SDN.
In particular, we first proposed Network Policy Analyzer (NPA), a system that can
be used to analyze whether a given network policy is well written or not. NPA mimics what
network administrators think about when enforcing a given network policy and checks
whether there are any ambiguous or missing values in the policy statement. Policymakers
can use the output of NPA to improve the writing of the policies so that both the network
users (readers of the policies) and network administrators will have fewer misunderstandings
regarding the network policies.
Then we proposed Network Policy Conversation Engine (NPCE) which allows
users to query network policy violations using natural language questions.

Network

administrators, as well as policymakers, can ask questions and query the network without
knowing the details of the query language.
Next, to support future Internet routing policy based on the source address and
understand how ASes are connected and the locations of IXPs in the Internet topology,
we collected publicly available data from data sources such as PeeringDB, Packet Clearing
House, and CAIDA. We created an Internet topology graph in the graph database Neo4j
so that the users can find the information about IXPs and ASes they are interested in.
Lastly, we focused on network policy management in a hybrid SDN/Legacy network.
We first analyzed the concerns network administrators may have for giving permission to
researchers and their SDN applications that potentially control the network. A proposed
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cooperative model assured campus network administrations of the fact that limited ITapproved content and actions in the flows would do no harm to the normal operation of
the campus network. Besides the model of shared trust and control of the network, we also
proposed an approach to extend the VIP Lanes high-speed SDN services to the legacy part
of the network. Taking advantage of Policy-Based Routing and protocols such as SNMP,
the SDN controller could have a view of the legacy switch and provide SDN services to the
hosts connected.
7.2

Future Work

The work described in this thesis makes significant strides toward improving network
policies, but can be extended to further improve the ways policies are written and applied.
Example future work includes:
• NLP Training: Introducing NLP to network policy management has a promising
future. However, the trained NLP models are dependent on the number as well as
the characteristics of the training examples being used. In this dissertation, both
of the two proposed systems that trained NLP models have hundreds of samples for
the training. As has been discussed in Chapter 4, NLP libraries such as spaCy have
recommended a minimum number of training examples. The creation of such Named
Entity Extraction models is to generalize, which means that even though words have
never appeared in the training samples, the system should still be able to recognize
such words. For future work, more network policies are to be collected for the training
to increase the accuracy of the system.
• Optimize Network Monitoring: In NPCE, we collected network data on the granularity of both the flow level and the packet level. In the prototype implementation,
there was only one switch connected. However, this is not the case in the production
network.

It should be examined whether such kinds of network monitoring will

influence the normal transmission of the network traffic. Algorithms can be designed
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based on the network traffic type described in the network policy documents on where
to place such monitoring functions.
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Appendices

Appendix A

List of Abbreviations

ACL Access Control List
AI Artificial Intellingence
API Application Programming Interface
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
AS Autonomous System
ASN Autonomous System Number
ASDM Adaptive Security Device Manager
AUP Acceptable Use Policy
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
CDP Cisco Discovery Protocol
CIO Chief Information Officer
CLI Command-Line Interface
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DNS Domain Name System
DoS Denial of Service
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
EIGRP Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol
ESDX Economic Software-Defined eXchange
FTP File Transfer Protocl
GENI Global Environment for Network Innovations
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
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HTTPS HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure
IANA Internet Assigned Number Authority
IBN Intent-Based Networking
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IOS Internetwork Operating System
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IRC Internet Relay Chat
ISP Internet Service Provider
IXP Internet Exchange Point
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Service
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
LSTM Long Short Term Memory
MAC Media Access Control
ML Machine Learning
NAT Network Address Translation
NBI Northbound Interface
NER Named Entity Recognition
NGFW Next-Generation Firewall
NIC Network Interface Card
NLP Natural Language Processing
NOS Network Operating System
NPCE Network Policy Conversation Engine
NPA Network Policy Analyzer
OS Operating System
OSI Open System Interconnect
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
OVS Open Virtual Switch
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OVSDB Open vSwitch Database
PBR Policy-Based Routing
PC Policy Committee
PoP Point of Presence
QoS Quality of Service
RCP Remote Copy
REST REpresentational State Transfer
RIR Regional Internet Registry
RPKI Resource Public Key Infrastructure
RS Route Server
SDN Software-Defined Network
SDX Software-Defined eXchange
SFTP SSH File Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SQL Structured Query Language
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network

Appendix B

Other Policies and Discussion

In Chapter 4, we showed example policies about Insecure Protocols, P2P File Sharing,
Network Scanning, and Bandwidth Usage. We discuss the assessment of some network
policies on other topics in this appendix. We categorize the policies based on the topics and
discuss the factors that prevent the policies from being implemented correctly. In particular,
we focus on two aspects (1) Where to find the information about the extracted entities and
(2) What tools are available to detect the network traffic described in the policy statement?
We only list a few network policies to illustrate the problem in this appendix.

144

Appendix B.1

Explanation for the Extracted Information

The ambiguities in the network policies may exist due to the unmatched information kept by
the network administrators. Once NLP systems extract the information from the policies,
they should be further converted to lower-level details for automatic enforcement. In other
words, the lack of an information database, e.g, an alias file which provides details to
support the extracted information is making the network policies difficult to be understood
completely. Such an information database, which should be recognized and agreed upon by
both the policymakers and network administrators will be helpful to reduce or eliminate
the ambiguities in the network policies. Without such a database for the explanation, the
extracted information becomes ambiguous.
• Unauthorized Services
“Baylor University does not allow network users to run unauthorized
SMTP, DHCP, DNS, or directory services on any networks.” [148]
In this policy, protocols such as SMTP, DHCP and DNS are mentioned. An alias file
can record the transport layer protocol and the port numbers used by these protocols.
To distinguish between authorized and unauthorized traffic, the IP addresses of such
authorized SMTP, DHCP, and DNS servers should be provided. On the other hand, for
the term directory services, what are the common protocols used for such services?
These protocols should also be agreed upon by both the policymakers and the network
administrators and recorded in the alias file so that the ambiguities are eliminated.
• Recreational Games
“Due to limited network resources, the use of CAMPBELL network
facilities for playing graphics-based interactive games is prohibited.”
[99]
In this policy, the term graphics-based interactive games is causing confusion.
What port numbers and protocols can be used to represent the traffic generated
by such games should be discussed and agreed on in the alias file to eliminate the
ambiguities.
• Domain Registration
“The registration of commercial hostnames to a SUNY Delhi Wireless
IP address is strictly prohibited.” [149]
In this policy, the term commercial hostnames is confusing. Details about such
hostnames should be provided as a list in the alias file to make the policy clear.
• Unauthorized IP
“Only officially assigned Internet Protocol (IP) numbers may be used
for equipment connected to the University’s data network.” [150]
In this policy, details of the officially assigned IP should be provided, for example,
the IP address range provided by the official DHCP server and the pre-approved static
IP addresses. All the other IPs observed will be considered as a violation of this policy.
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Appendix B.2

Tools For Traffic Detection

The 5-tuple is a concept that describes the characteristics of a basic TCP/IP connection.
Network policies about application layer protocols as well as other policies about the use
of IP addresses can be enforced within a rule using the 5-tuple before the network traffic is
actually observed. However, some types of network traffic described by the network policies,
which involve characteristics beyond the 5-tuple, require sophisticated tools or systems for
detection. Network administrators want clear information about what tools are available
and whether these tools can detect the network traffic described in the policies. Without
such information, the policies become potentially not enforceable.
• Network Monitoring
“Attempts to monitor, analyze, or tamper with network data packets
that are not explicitly addressed to your computer are prohibited.” [94]
Data interception may occur in the network. Some types of interception can be
detected based on the intercepted data. For example, there are tools that can detect
HTTPS interception attacks. In fact, there should be a match between what is
recorded in the network policies and the corresponding alias file that documents
the tools used to detect such traffic. In this policy, network administrators need
clear information about what types of traffic will be generated by the behavior of
monitor, analyze or tamper with packets and what tools can be used to detect
the network traffic. Otherwise, they become ambiguities in the policy.
• Unauthorized Devices
“University students, faculty, staff, volunteers and guests shall not install
wireless networking equipment in University owned or leased spaces
without written consent from the Information Security and Policy Office.”
[10]
In this policy, the term wireless networking equipment is ambiguous. Network
administrators will be confused about which devices are considered wireless network
equipment and what tools can be used to detect the traffic generated by these devices.
The definition of wireless networking equipment and the approach to detect them
should be recorded in the alias file.
All the collected policies and assessments can be found at [151].
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with Monocle. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 45(4):595–596,
2015.
151

[71] Kai Bu, Xitao Wen, Bo Yang, Yan Chen, Li Erran Li, and Xiaolin Chen. Is Every
Flow on the Right Track?: Inspect SDN Forwarding with RuleScope. In IEEE
INFOCOM 2016-The 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications, pages 1–9. IEEE, 2016.
[72] Seyed K Fayaz, Yoshiaki Tobioka, Sagar Chaki, and Vyas Sekar. Scalable Testing
of Context-Dependent Policies over Stateful Data Planes with Armstrong. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1505.03356, 2015.
[73] Arthur S Jacobs, Ricardo J Pfitscher, Rafael H Ribeiro, Ronaldo A Ferreira,
Lisandro Z Granville, Walter Willinger, and Sanjay G Rao. Hey, Lumi! Using Natural
Language for Intent-Based Network Management. In 2021 USENIX Annual Technical
Conference (USENIX ATC 21), pages 625–639, 2021.
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